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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, D.D., F.S.A.

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A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 1 MARCH VOL. XXXVIII

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

PROCREATION AND CONTRACEPTIVES: THE LEGAL AND ROMAN CATHOLIC VIEWPOINTS

The judgment of the House of Lords pronounced by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Jowitt) in the recent case of *Baxter v. Baxter* has deservedly attracted much attention, for it refused a decree of nullity to a husband who had petitioned for it on the ground that his wife had declined to bear children during ten years of cohabitation. It would appear that the wife had not refused sexual intercourse, but by the use of contraceptives had precluded conception against her husband's wishes. Lord Jowitt in his judgment refused to agree with the argument that 'a marriage was not consummated unless children were procreated, or that the procreation of children was the principal end of marriage.' He said that it seemed to him that the right view was expressed by Lord Stair in his *Institutions* (ed. 1681, Book I, title 4, par. 6) thus:

> 'So then it is not the consent to marry; as it relateth to the procreation of children, that is requisite; for it may consist, though the woman be far beyond that date; but it is the consent, whereby ariseth that conjugal society which may have the conjunction of bodies as well as of minds; as the general end of the constitution of marriage is the solace and satisfaction of man.'

This is felicitously expressed in the familiar words of our Prayer Book Marriage Service: 'for the mutual society, help, and comfort, that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.'

On January 11th Cardinal Griffin took the opportunity in commenting on Lord Jowitt's judgment to reiterate the Roman Catholic point of view. He was concerned, he said, not so much with the judgment as with the reasons given for making it.

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'The Catholic Church has always taught that the primary purpose of marriage is the procreation of children and the object of the marriage contract is the right to actions fitted of their nature for this purpose. The Code of Canon Law states: "The primary purpose of marriage is the procreation and education of children" . . . This is also clear from the Book of Genesis when God bade our first parents and, through them, all married persons who should come after them, to increase and multiply and fill the earth . . . The primary purpose of marriage is the procreation of children and their subsequent education.

'With regard to the use of contraceptives Pope Pius XI says: "The act of wedlock is of its very nature designed for the procreation of offspring, and therefore those who in performing it deprive it of its natural power and efficacy act against nature and do something which is shameful and intrinsically immoral" . . . The Church has never admitted the right of the State either to dissolve or to declare null Christian marriages. The Canon Law says: "Matrimonial causes between baptized persons belong exclusively to the ecclesiastical court."'

On February 5th the Primate, Dr. Fisher, said in a statement issued to the press:

'Whatever may be the legal interpretation of "consummation," the doctrine of the Church is and remains that procreation of children is one of the principal ends, if not the principal end, of marriage; and consummation, which means completion, has not been reached if by the use of artificial means procreation has been wilfully and deliberately prevented. It is the Christian duty of man and wife, unless prevented by physical causes, to have children: and either partner, by seeking to prevent this against the will of the other, is guilty of grave sin in defrauding the other and disregarding mutual marital obligations.'

It will be observed that the Primate does not state whether a dereliction of Christian duty takes place where both parties are agreed that their marriage shall be childless. He does not define what is included in his phrase 'physical causes.' Do these include a predisposition to hereditary disease (*e.g.* tuberculosis, mental weakness, etc.)? Do they include economic poverty? J. S. Mill laid it down that no British parent had a right to have children unless he could educate them at least as well as he (the parent) had been educated, and under the term 'education' must be included the conditions of the home-life. Again, do they include danger to the wife's life? This last reason is not recognized by the Roman authorities, for when at childbirth the midwife is faced with the terrible alternative of having to sacrifice the life either of the mother or of the infant, the Roman Church has decreed that it is the mother's life that must be sacrificed.

The extreme position adopted by the Roman Catholic authorities in their insistence on procreation as the chief aim of marriage is exemplified by the following case reported in the *Daily Express* of February 7th:

'Mrs. Arthur Richards, 24-year-old wife of a paralysed ex-airman, has

been excommunicated by the Roman Catholic Church because she was married in a Methodist church.

'Her husband had agreed to become a Roman Catholic. Then Mrs. Richards was told that the Roman Catholic Church could not recognize a marriage that must inevitably be childless, and she was warned that marriage in another church would mean excommunication . . .

'A Roman Catholic priest explained: "Our Church considers the procreation of children as the primary purpose of marriage, and cannot recognize the marriage of anyone who cannot be a parent."'

Modern science has, in the sphere of human procreation, given power to human beings not possessed by their ancestors. To prohibit the use of this power is to play the part of Canute in forbidding the advance of the tide. If the Church is to make any pronouncement about the use of contraceptives its guidance must be clear, courageous, practical, and exhibit a sympathetic understanding of the peculiar difficulties with which married people are faced and of the way in which contraceptives may be responsibly used in the face of such situations. Such guidance by the Church would be welcomed. Where it is lacking, as at present, individuals must decide for themselves in accordance with the advice of their medical consultant. Perhaps, after all, this is the best solution, especially when an unmarried clergy determines the Church's pronouncements.

The Inhibition of a Bishop

The *Oxford Mail* of February 7th publishes in a brief paragraph the result of a lawsuit of serious import for our Anglican Churches in the Dominions:

'The Equity Court in Sydney to-day granted an injunction restraining the Anglican Bishop of Bathurst, Dr. Arnold Wylde, from using or authorizing any form for the administration of the Sacrament other than that contained in the Book of Common Prayer.

'In September last the New South Wales Attorney-General objected on behalf of laymen members of the Church of England against Dr. Wylde's sanction of the *Red Book*. The objectors complained that the bishop caused breaches of trust under which Anglican Church property was held.'

Bishop Wylde is a High Anglican: the service of Holy Communion which he has authorized is of a type which has become usual in High Anglican churches in England. Of course these High Anglican services of Holy Communion, invariably spoken of as the Mass by those who celebrate them, are illegal as they differ from the Holy Communion service of the Prayer Book of 1662 by introducing into that service ceremonial and ritual borrowed from medieval and Roman practice. Such is the strength of the High Anglican party in this country that our bishops wink at

this lawlessness, and the parochial laity who dislike these practices, having protested in vain against them to the Church authorities, desert their parish churches. Probably no cause has been more potent in 'emptying churches' in England. In the British Dominions, however, where Anglo-Catholicism is comparatively weak, lay influence has been strong enough to check this movement for substituting the Roman High Mass for the English Holy Communion. This is particularly the case in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, although in certain dioceses in these Dominions, where the bishops themselves are strong Anglo-Catholics, as for instance in Brisbane (Australia) and Waikato (New Zealand), this movement is advancing.

There is, however, one great barrier to the advance of this Anglo-Catholic lawlessness in these Anglican Churches in the Dominions. These Churches are not Established, and therefore it might easily be assumed that, being liberated from the 'tyranny of the State,' they enjoy a much greater freedom in their liturgical practices than exists in England. This, however, is far from being the case. These Churches, in order to possess property, accumulate endowments, inherit legacies, had to become legal corporations, and this could only be done by Acts of the Colonial Legislatures. These Acts dealing with trust property have to prescribe the terms under which such property could be possessed and enjoyed. One of the conditions prescribed is invariably the use of the Church of England Prayer Book services of 1662; as a consequence the action of the Bishop of Bathurst imperils the retention of its diocesan endowments, and also threatens other grave disadvantages such as might arise from legal proceedings creating a schism by which the schismatic body, which adhered to the legal terms of the Church trust, would become the legal possessors of all the diocesan property. Such a disaster might be remedied by new legislation altering the terms of incorporation, but the difficulties and dangers which would accompany the securing of this remedy are too serious to win the support of sober-minded Churchmen.

There is, however, a *tertium quid*, an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Certain of the Dominions however have deprived their citizens of this right of appeal, and where this is not the case, the expense and difficulties of such an appeal may well preclude its being made. The ideal of a free Church in a free State, proclaimed by Cavour, is really incapable of being realized by any Church, unless it is prepared to part with its temporalities and be satisfied to lay up for itself treasures in heaven. If, however, it is not prepared to sacrifice its terrestrial

ossessions, the only way by which it can retain them in a modern tate is by submitting to those restrictions even of its doctrine nd worship which a legal protection demands from the ecclesistical society seeking legal incorporation. English Churchmen, ressing for disestablishment in this country, may do well to ask aemselves whether they would really gain the freedom they desire they exchanged the King Log of Church Establishment for the King Stork of legal incorporation.

Opposition to the Revised Canons

On February 27th the Council of the M.C.U. passed unaniously the following resolution:

> 'That the attempt to promulgate a revised code of Canons is singularly ill-timed, because the country and the Church are passing through a period of change which before its conclusion may easily render revisions out-of-date, and because some of the proposed changes are highly contentious both in their effect and in the principles on which they are based, so that a revision of Canon Law will rather arouse opposition than promote uniformity.'

A second resolution was passed by the Council appointing a committee to watch the issue and take appropriate action should the situation demand. We are glad to observe that the attitude of the Modernists and Liberals is in harmony with that of the editor of *Theology*. In his editorial of September, 1947, Dr. Vidler deprecates the legalization of the Revised code of Canons. He is

> 'by no means convinced that the time is ripe for what the Commissioners recommend. Would anything substantial be gained if it were given legislative effect? We doubt it.' (p. 321.)
>
> 'At the back of the Canons to which we are alluding are theological principles concerning which it is notorious or it ought to be notorious that convictions in the Church of England are deeply divided.
>
> 'More harm than good would be done by any endeavour to press through new legislation on these subjects before both the clergy and the laity as a whole have been convinced that it is right and have a sufficient understanding of the principles on which it is grounded.' (p. 322.)

Perhaps what concerns most of our Modern Churchmen is that hese revised Canons might be legalized without the consent of the aity. It is true that the Primate has given formal assurance that he assent of the laity as represented by the House of Laity in he National Assembly shall be sought to any revised Canons; but ll who are aware of the method of appointment of members of he House of Laity realize how unrepresentative that body is. Here again we find ourselves in complete agreement with the dvice given by the editor of *Theology*: '(1) that the actual revision of the Canon Law should be postponed *sine die*, and meanwhile (2) that the Church's legislative organs should first be

reformed.' (p. 323.) The basis of these conclusions is assuredly sound:

> 'The truth is that the Church of England is not now in a period of theological or social stability but in a period of theological upheaval and incalculable social change. There could scarcely be a less suitable moment for attempting to stabilize its law.' (p. 323.)

If military cannons be the *ultima ratio regum*, Canons Ecclesiastical should surely be regarded as *le dernier ressort des évêques*.

Dr. Chavasse and the Marriage of the Divorced

The *Church Times* of February 13th indignantly reproves Bishop Chavasse for authorizing in the Rochester diocese a 'private service of prayer and dedication to be used in church after a re-marriage in a Register Office.' The great majority of Churchpeople and, we have to add, those who are not churchpeople, in this country are certainly supporters of the Bishop's action; they will not feel that the Bishop is lowering the Christian ideal of marriage as a monogamous life-long union, or, in the case of those whose first marriage has been a failure (for which they may or may not have been to blame), that a Christian bishop is wrong in trying to help such persons when marrying again. In response to their desire for such assistance it may be presumed that those divorced persons, entering on a new marriage legalized by the Registrar, who desire religious solemnization of their legal union, realize the assistance which religion can give in making a marriage happy and dutiful. If this be so, it is surely an act of Christian charity to grant their request. The fact that the service prescribed by the Bishop of Rochester is private, and in this respect differs from the authorized public marriage service, would seem to indicate that it is of the nature of a concession and not a right. In supporting Dr. Chavasse's action, it is not to be assumed that we are not in entire agreement with the conclusions reached in *The Clergy and Marriage of the Divorced** by Rev. G. L. H. Harvey and expressed in a recent resolution of the Council of the M.C.U., namely, that

> 'in the light of New Testament teaching taken as a whole, of the tradition of the Church of England and of the civil law, it is the duty of the parochial clergy to fulfil their legal, moral and spiritual responsibilities towards parishioners by conscientiously exercising their right of discretion in cases where divorced persons desire marriage in church.'

This resolution insists that the decision in such cases rests with the parochial incumbent, not with the bishop, and that there are cases when the parochial incumbent is legally, morally and spiritually justified in using the Prayer Book marriage service in re-marrying

* Published by the Modern Churchmen's Union, 1/3.

a divorced person entering on a second marriage while the partner of a former marriage is still living.

In his pastoral letter to his clergy, Dr. Chavasse refers to the replies to a questionnaire sent out to some eighty divorced persons who had been allowed a Service of Prayer for God's blessing after a civil marriage. The Bishop writes—and his verdict is based on ten years' experience of the results of his policy—

> 'the failures among second marriages are too few to present any problem.'

The conclusion is obvious : that requests for a Service of this kind should always be sympathetically received by the clergy.

Australian Religious Statistics

The *Australian Church of England Newsletter* of February 9th publishes some significant statistics of religion in the Commonwealth. The first group concerns church attendance :

> 'Taking all denominations together, only one person in three attended religious service on either of the two Sundays preceding the survey. The percentage of churchgoers increased with age, from 29 per cent. among those in the twenties to 38 per cent. for the fifties. Of the five major denominations in Australia, only Roman Catholics and Baptists have churchgoing majorities among those who claim allegiance, the percentages being : R.C. 63 per cent., Baptist 54 per cent., Methodist 34 per cent., Presbyterian 31 per cent., Church of England 19 per cent.'

We are not surprised that the percentage of English Churchpeople attending their church services comes lowest in the scale and that of the Roman Catholics highest. The English Churchman values the Occasional Offices of the Church (christenings, marriages, burials, and in a lesser degree confirmations and churchings), but the weekly services—which are by no means weekly in many country places in Australia—are not valued to anything like the same extent. In the case of the Roman Church, the clergy insist on attendance at the Sunday Mass as a matter of obligation. The English Churchman is unable to identify his Church with his religion as the Roman Catholic does. 'Is God a Roman Catholic?' was the question put by a boy to his father just after they had been admitted into the Roman Catholic Church. A good Romanist would have no hesitation in answering 'Yes,' but we doubt if any English clergyman could think of God as an Anglican.

The second class of Australian statistics deals with religious belief :

> 'Despite the widespread neglect of public worship, there are, according to the poll, very few who do not believe in the existence of God. To the question, "Do you believe in God?" 95 per cent. answered "Yes." Two in every three professed belief in an existence after death.'

In Great Britain there is evidence that belief in the divine existence is much more widespread than the belief in personal immortality. This may be due in part to the disappearance of belief in hell-fire, but we are inclined to think that its real cause is biological teaching on the survival of the fittest: the doctrine of conditional is replacing that of inevitable immortality. The percentage of those affirming belief in God is higher than we should have expected: it is so much easier to answer 'I don't know.' We could wish that our decennial census in Great Britain included a religious census, as it does in the British Dominions. Such a census possesses both a sociological and a political value and is a check on the tendency of sects to exaggerate their numbers.

The third class of Australian religious statistics concerns the need for a modern and more easily understood version of the Bible. The upshot of this third journalistic enquiry can be summarized as follows: first, that the Authorized Version is still overwhelmingly a best-seller. This would delight the soul of Quiller-Couch, who desired to make the A.V. a text-book for the Cambridge English Tripos.

> 'It is of interest to note that the New Testament in Basic English sells slowly but steadily in Australian bookshops. Dr. Moffatt's translation is more popular, and is even read from the lectern in some churches. There is also a good demand for Dr. Weymouth's recension, and even the *Twentieth Century New Testament*. One may also see on the bookstalls the Bishop of London's paraphrase entitled, "New Testament Letters." But Bishop C. V. Pilcher, head of the New Testament Department at Sydney University, commends, as an attempt to render the New Testament into modern speech, the translation by Dr. J. B. Phillips in his *Letters to Young Churches*, published last year.'

The demand for a new translation of the Bible on the ground that the A.V. retains an archaic vocabulary 'not understanded of the people' is a most inadequate and misleading plea. There is nothing incomprehensible in the vocabulary of the A.V.: there is hardly a word in it which 'the wayfaring man, though a fool,' does not understand. Where failure to understand comes in is in the religious background, the primitive beliefs, ethical standards, social practices, political policies which the Bible enshrines and which must be understood in some measure if the reader is to discern the theological and ethical development which the Bible as a whole records. The full understanding of this religious evolution requires a basic knowledge of the assured results of literary and historical criticism of the Bible. When this Biblical education is possessed, it will provide the reader of our greatest literary treasure in the English language with an understanding of the essential teaching of the Bible such as no vulgarized translation can provide for him.

Here we ought to add how much has been gained for the reader of the Bible by reprinting the A.V. in such a manner as to distinguish verse from prose, and dialogue from narrative. The rearrangement by which paragraphs take the place of chapters and verses has been equally helpful, as also the development of marginal references which provide alternative translations of the text. If moreover we had explanatory headlines and succinct prefaces inserted into our A.V., we should gain more from the study of it than from modern popular translations.

A Modernist Broadsheet

A group of Modernist younger clergymen in the Birmingham diocese have recently issued the first of a series of broadsheets on Christian aims and methods. They state, truly enough, that the Church of England is passing through a crisis, described as 'the collapse of the parochial system.' This collapse is usually ascribed in Church gatherings to the shortage of clergy and the poverty of the Church. The authors of the broadsheet do not take this view.

> 'The real cause of the crisis lies deeper in the life of both Church and Nation. The Church now counts for little and its buildings are no longer the centres to which Christian-minded people come, and from which they seek to draw inspiration to live in loyalty to Christ's standards. In some parishes a tradition of Church-going remains; this masks the general indifference to the Church which may be seen in new housing areas, where the first ten years in the life of a new Church usually produce a mere handful of Church people and have little effect on the population as a whole. No one doubts that this indifference is partly due to a widespread "paganism."'

The remedy, they believe, is not to stress the opposition between the Church and the world, nor to tighten up Church discipline, nor to seek to recreate traditional doctrines and methods of church worship. On the contrary, the Church must seek as many points of contact as possible with all that is best in our modern life and strive to develop co-operation and fellowship on those lines. Its motto ought to be not 'Come out from among them,' but rather 'Live in fellowship with them.'

> 'We maintain that more often the failure of the Church has been a failure to remain in touch with the life of the people, to serve their needs and to share with them the fruits of its spiritual life.
>
> 'The new starting-point should be the study of the spiritual needs of the people, and not the desire to justify and conserve the fading traditional patterns of Church life. For attempts to superimpose a dogmatic faith and a disciplined Church life on life which at its every-day level denies all that Christianity stands for, are so artificial that their failure is inevitable. The signs of such failure are all too clear. The true work of the Church is not bounded by its self-made limits, but is concerned with the spiritual possibilities of the whole of life.'

'To do this the Church has to take its place in the life of the people, and make a positive and practical contribution to the art of living. Its first duty lies in those parts of life where to-day Christian insight and inspiration are most needed. These will be found to be the effective spheres of witness, and to provide the opportunities for teaching the faith which inspires Christian practice.

'Three examples of such contacts with modern life make clear the kind of approach needed:

'1. *Home Life.* The moral break-down is bound up with the loss of interest in the practical skill required in home life. The Christian ideal of marriage needs to be given a practical content, in which family life would be seen to be, at the same time, of absorbing interest and spiritual value. There is need for a movement, sponsored by the Church, of young married people, in which Christian insight inspires the learning and practice of the technique of home-life, cookery, gardening, parenthood, etc. In this, the Church should be willing to learn from such movements as the Women's Institutes and the Peckham Family Health Centre, and the Church should also help such movements to understand the spiritual basis of their own work.

'2. *Daily Work.* The implications of the sacramental nature of man's work needs to be thought out by Christian people, who individually, and as a group, are making a conscious effort to make their work a vital part of their Christian calling. The Church should not only make protests about conditions of employment which make a sense of vocation a mockery, but supply the spiritual incentive to work, by making men value their work as a part of their Christian duty and of the fulfilment of their lives' purpose. In Youth Work, for example, the emphasis should be more on work and vocational training than on the lighter side of recreation. The Church would be making better use of its resources by promoting a movement which stressed the idea of vocation (and such other things as home-life, the creative use of leisure and service of the community), rather than by providing facilities for table-tennis, billiards and dancing for those young people whom it regards as its most loyal members.

'3. *Community Life.* The Christian idea of fellowship is an important contribution which the Church can make at a time when many are aware that the sense of community needs to be re-built in the new social units of the cities. The parochial system, although originating in units of up to 5,000 people, and not 30,000 or 40,000, gives the Church great opportunities, if its work is seen to embrace all and not only "Church people." It should be active in community activities that already exist and in encouraging new ones; any of its own organizations which by isolating its members from their neighbours, do not make for community, should be discarded and replaced by groups which help to permeate the whole community of the parish with the spirit of Christian fellowship, or which are engaged in pioneer experiments in community life. For example, the Church with its centres in both town and country can show the way to solve the pressing problems of bringing townspeople and country people together, and of giving the townsman that experience of the beauty, dignity and rhythm of Nature which is necessary to wholeness of life and spiritual well-being.'

The writers emphasize that they desire to be neither revolutionaries nor reactionaries, but seek to expand and develop the field of Christian service in loyalty to those ideals which have

always characterized the life of the Christian Church from its beginning. (*cf.* Troeltsch's monumental work on the history of the Church's social life and institutions.)

'One important principle has to be applied — that everyone, unless he definitely dissociates himself, should be regarded as a member of the Church. This implies reunion at the parochial level by regarding full membership in the Free Churches as equivalent to the status of a confirmed member of the Church of England. This would lead naturally to inter-communion for which there is ample historical precedent within the Church of England. It is the necessary first step in extending the fellowship of the Church, and essential if those who hold aloof are going to take the Church and its message seriously.

'The Church, fortunately, has not altogether lost its position in the life of the people, and the ties which remain between them should be carefully developed and strengthened. That many who do not attend Church regularly turn to the Church at the solemn moments of their lives, shows that the religious life of the nation is not dead, or completely separated from the Church. It has been said that no man is more receptive of spiritual truth than on his wedding day, at the baptism of his first child, and at the funeral of his mother. The Occasional Offices, therefore, are Services of great value. In some parishes the biggest adult Sunday congregation is at the monthly Service of Baptism; this should therefore be a real Service to which much care and attention is given, and an occasion when the essential Christian truths that it expresses are made clear. These are obscured by the Prayer Book Service, even in the 1928 form, and it needs considerable revision. This applies to other Prayer Book Services, and there is urgent need for an alternative Creed which expresses the historic truths of Christianity in simple words in harmony with modern knowledge. Similarly, Special Sundays, linked with the natural life of the people, are also of value, and on occasions when large numbers of people come to Church the Services should be simple in form, so that they can be understood by those not familiar with the Prayer Book Services. People who have learned the relevance of Christianity in their daily lives will expect to find a similar relevance and reasonableness in its worship and teaching.

'Those in positions to speak as leaders of the Church have their utterances widely reported in the daily Press, and read critically by a wide public. It would seem, however, that the wisest utterances of the Church leaders in recent years, for example, at Lambeth in 1920 and 1930, and in the Doctrinal Report, have been quietly shelved. Recent statements about the attitude of the Church to the re-marriage of the innocent party to a divorce are examples of such a tendency. The facts, that the Church has not always condemned such re-marriages and that some clergy do conduct the Marriage Service for those whom they feel are sincere in seeking, as is their legal right, re-marriage in Church, are not mentioned, and the policy of the Church is made out to be uniformly one which is unacceptable to many sincere Christian people.

'The critical issue, then, before the Church, both in parochial life and in the councils of its leaders, is a choice between two policies. One is based, out of loyalty to our Master and in acceptance of the guidance of the Holy Spirit which obeys no man-made limitations, on broad Christian sympathy and the adventurous spirit which does not hesitate to explore new ways. The second policy is based, out of false loyalty to a tradition imperfectly understood, and with the desire in a rapidly changing world

to preserve a part of the pattern of the past, on a narrow conception of Church life and a timid conservatism. The second will lead to the withdrawal of the Church into its supposed strongholds, leaving the main stream of national life a prey to the "paganism" which the Church deplores. The first, vigorously pursued by the whole Church, might yet rally all Christianly minded men and women and restore the Church to its rightful place of spiritual leadership in national life.'

What can be done by a policy which St. Vincent of Lerins described as *non nova sed nove* has been exemplified by the achievements of Dick Sheppard and his successors at St. Martin-in-the-Fields. The art of how to vary the length of the bowling without breaking the rules of the game is what the true interests of both Church and nation need to-day. We congratulate our younger Modernist clergy on their endeavour to present this ideal in their broadsheet.

We are glad to note that *The Modern Free Churchman* (January, 1948) 'offers a warm welcome' to the broadsheet.

Good Wine needs no Bush

A sharp controversy has arisen in Church circles over the proposal put forward in the report of the Publicity Committee presented to the Church Assembly at its recent session. The report proposed that £14,000 per annum should be spent on Church publicity and that the Chief Information Officer should receive a salary of £2,000 a year plus expenses. This proposal was strongly supported by the Bishop of London in the Church Assembly and effectively criticized by the Dean of Chichester and other speakers. As a result the matter was postponed. We ardently hope, in the best interests of the Church, that nothing further will be done about it.

It is hard to imagine any cause in this country which receives more general publicity than the Christian Church. In at least 14,000 churches every Sunday that cause is proclaimed by men trained for that purpose. The number of Church societies, parochial, diocesan, national, which exist to propagate the Christian religion and its Church activities must run into thousands; Church publications, official and non-official, including Bibles, prayer-books, hymn-books, run into millions. As to press notices, anything worth saying either to the credit or discredit of the Church seems to receive a good deal more publicity than it deserves. Every parochial clergyman has constantly reason to thank the Press for its courtesy and generosity in granting space for his parochial activities. The fullest information about the Church can be obtained by consulting *Crockford's Clerical Directory* — a monument of minute accuracy — and a large number of other

books of reliable Church statistics. All these forms of publicity have been enormously supplemented in recent times by the extremely valuable religious propaganda of the B.B.C., so that we are well acquainted with the personalities and voices of all the Christian leaders in our English-speaking religious world. The expense of this many-sided publicity — and it must run into vast sums — is defrayed as a part of the business cost of these enterprises. There is therefore not the slightest need to supplement this astonishing Church publicity by creating a special organization to be financed out of the funds administered by the Church Assembly. When we recall the great difficulty which many parishes have in raising the quota demanded by the Church authorities for their central funds, it is extremely important that no public impression should be created that these contributions are being expended on Church publicity by Church officials who derive large salaries for this needless propaganda.

But the objection to the creation of a Church publicity organization on the ground of its needless expense is, in the minds of many Christian people, infinitely less strong than the feelings of revulsion which such a policy arouses. It appears to them as a degradation of the Christian religion. This feeling is reflected in the following letter in *The Times* of February 3rd; its writer is a clergyman who is also an historian.

> Sir,
>
> May I beg the hospitality of your columns to protest against the proposal you record to set up a publicity office for the Church of England as being the strongest attack on Christianity which, even in this secular age, has yet been launched? Apart from the obvious fact that it is the negation of everything that the Church should stand for — 'the seed growing secretly' — it would inevitably have the effect of encouraging the less desirable qualities in the ministry, in the sense of perpetual and public concessions to Mammon.
>
> One hoped for—and might have expected—an immediate and public disclaimer of this preposterous scheme from the entire Bench of Bishops. In the absence of any such official protest, I am writing this letter in the hope that it may represent the opinion of at least some of my fellow-priests.
>
> I am, &c.,
>
> Hugh Ross Williamson.

IN MEMORIAM

ALFRED LESLIE LILLEY

By the sudden death of Archdeacon Lilley on January 31st, while reading *The Times*' obituary notice of Mahatma Gandhi, the Modernist cause in this country has lost a beloved and stalwart adherent. An Irishman born in the Protestant North in 1860, educated at St. Columba's and Trinity College, Dublin, ordained in 1889, he held his first curacy in Ireland and then migrated to England and became Vicar of St. Mary's, Paddington, in 1900. There by the quality of his teaching he attracted an educated congregation. In 1911 Bishop Percival appointed him to a residentiary canonry, where he had as his fellow-canons Hastings Rashdall and B. H. Streeter; in 1913 he became Archdeacon of Ludlow. He severed his connection with Hereford in 1938 and retired to live in Oxford.

Admirable as a cathedral preacher, he was not less admirable as an archdeacon, for he combined in a remarkable degree practical wisdom, charming courtesy and a cultured understanding of ecclesiastical buildings and institutions. Perhaps his most valuable service to his fellow-churchmen consisted in his exposition of the Modernist movement in the Roman Church, which achieved its greatest influence in the tenth decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth. Lilley was an excellent linguist, and combined with his knowledge of the classical tongues a fluency in French, German and Italian; this linguistic knowledge, united to his sympathetic understanding of medieval scholasticism, provided him with an unrivalled equipment for the masterly exposition of Romanist Modernism. Among his closest friends were Father George Tyrrell and Baron Friedrich von Hügel. Lilley's exposition of the causes, aims and methods of the Roman Modernists first appeared in the form of numerous articles in the English press. *The Programme of Modernism*, his volume on this theme which appeared in 1908 after Romanist Modernism had received its death-blow from the encyclical *Dominici Pascendi Gregis* (issued by Pope Pius X from St. Peter's, September 8th, 1907), remains the most reliable account we have of that heroic movement. Lilley's masterly introduction is followed by a translation from the Italian of the Modernist reply to the papal encyclical, and concludes with a translation from the Latin of the encyclical itself. This encyclical, it will be recalled, condemned Modernism in the harshest terms as the 'synthesis of all

the heresies' and as the deadly enemy not only of Catholicism but even of religion itself: it authorized a policy of delation and suppression, as a result of which those who had risked all to provide a traditional Catholicism with a modern apology were either driven from the Roman Church or reduced to a demoralizing silence.

Lilley, who had been an Evangelical Protestant and then an Anglo-Catholic, now stood forth as an English Modernist and so remained until his death. He was a member of the first Modern Churchmen's Conference at Ripon in 1914, and he regularly attended the sessions of the latest M.C. Conference to be held in Somerville College, Oxford, in 1945. He was well known as a Select Preacher before the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and he served as a Chaplain to the Forces in the First World War.

He published numerous volumes: *Sir Joshua Fitch*, 1906; *Adventus Regni*, 1907; *Modernism*, 1908; *The Soul of St. Paul*, 1909; *The Religion of Life*, 1910; *Nature and Supernature*, 1911; *Prayer in Christian Theology*, 1924; *Worship*, 1926; *Sacraments*, 1928; *Religion and Revelation*, 1932; and contributions to *Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 1919. Were we to select one of these for Lenten reading for good Churchpeople, we should commend *Sacraments; a Study of Some Moments in an Attempt to Define their Meaning for Christian Worship*, dedicated to his fellow-canons at Hereford. Lilley, a reverent sacramentalist, thus states the aim of his volume: 'to correct the tendency to magical conceptions from which sacramental practice is never wholly free' and to interpret the Sacraments in the light of 'the ideas of symbolism and instrumentality.'

His personal kindnesses were many. We venture to cite one instance: his generous support of Mrs. Oscar Wilde after the tragedy which befell her husband. We doubt if he ever made a personal enemy.

The *Hereford Times* of February 7th in its full obituary notice testifies to the highest estimation which was felt for Archdeacon Lilley in the diocese, and cites the following appreciation of him as a teacher of religion from A. G. Gardiner's *Pillars of Society*: 'In his preaching there is neither dogma nor controversy. It is always of the Kingdom that he speaks.'

H.D.A.M.

JOURNALIST AND CRUSADER

WILLIAM THOMAS STEAD, who was born at Embleton, Northumberland, on July 5th, 1849, and died in 1912, when the *Titanic*, on her maiden voyage, sank in the icy waters of the North Atlantic, was the most remarkable, if not the greatest, of British journalists. He would have been remarkable in any career, for he had brains and energy beyond the average allowance, but it is probable that in journalism he found the career in which his natural endowments were most certain to make him great as well as remarkable.

As a preacher or as a politician he might have become, after an initial success, mere sounding brass, however slight the risk would have been of his becoming a tinkling cymbal. Journalism saved him. It canalized his energy and forced him to test the validity of his opinions. It was no doubt 'good business' to found the *Review of Reviews*, but it was much more: it gave him the medium through which he was able to express himself to the greatest advantage. The world was his parish, and the *Review of Reviews* provided him with the best means available of discussing his parish's needs.

Stead was a prophet, a *forth*-teller; as a *fore*-teller he was not more notable than you or I. Indeed it is probable that men of his temperament are likely to be less happy in their predictions than people much less gifted. He had a feeling that his exit from the world's stage would be due to a rising of an infuriated populace; but, even if he had not gone down with the *Titanic*, it is extremely unlikely that he would have died a victim of mob violence. He would have been a crusader to the end of his life, but the hot blood would have cooled, and in old age he might have been as much a national institution as Mr. Gladstone.

Stead was a prophet, but not of the Hebrew school. He had the Hebrew zeal for righteousness and hatred of iniquity, but, being a modern Englishman, he was free to focus his spiritual forces and to speak plainly. A prophet living under an Oriental despotism had nothing but the crudest social and political machinery to work with, and his words, though unforgettable, were likely to be of uncertain application. Stead called a spade a spade. If it happened to be a bad spade he said so, however unpleasant the exposure was likely to be for the maker; if he thought it good, no shyness or diffidence prevented him from telling everyone how to use it.

Everyone read what he had to say. His literary style (which o doubt owed much to Thomas Carlyle, Macaulay and other 19th-entury masters, and certainly much to the Authorized Version of ie Bible) was an admirable medium for his thought. In his ritings there is no evidence of groping for the *mot juste*; thought lothed itself in appropriate words as readily as it seems to have lothed itself in the mind of Shakespeare.

He was fortunate in entering London journalism under the uidance of John Morley. He had worked for nine years in arlington as editor of the *Northern Echo*, but in 1880, when lorley invited him to the *Pall Mall Gazette*, he was still a young an and still ready to rush in where London journalists feared to ead. He was a provincial editor, but, unlike most provincial litors, he had been (according to the Lord Grey of the time) corresponding with kings and emperors all over the world and ceiving letters from statesmen of every nation.' On the other and, he had not had the usual educational advantages enjoyed y provincial editors. The son of a Congregational minister who ever had more than £150 a year, and at his son's birth had only 80, young Stead could not have had an Oxford or Cambridge ducation. London University would have admitted him, but *res ngusta domi* brought all formal education to an end in his teenth year. His father had taught him till he was twelve, and e had spent about two years at Silcoates School, near Wake-eld, where, according to his own account, he learnt from the eadmaster, an Irishman, three things — Christianity, cricket, and mocracy. His father had taught him Latin, and the boy no oubt continued the study at Silcoates, but the ancient languages Rome and Greece had little to do with the quality of his think-g or writing. He worked in a merchant's office in Newcastle-oon-Tyne for some years, and having contributed many articles the *Northern Echo* (for which he was not paid), he became, at e age of twenty-two, editor of the paper.

There must have been evidence of exceptional ability in s editorial work to induce Morley to invite him to be his sistant in editing the newly-founded *Pall Mall Gazette*. Of l contemporary journalists, Stead, one would have thought, was ast likely to work satisfactorily with Morley. Morley liked to ve his own way, and as was discovered years later by his sub-dinates in the Office of the Chief Secretary for Ireland and in e India Office, he knew how to get it. On the other hand, Stead as far from being lamb-like; and when he became aware of periority to his chief on the technical side of journalism, the urge assert himself must have been almost irresistible. It is clear, how-

ever, that he overcame the temptation, and in 1892 Morley, who was about to take over the very difficult duties of the Irish Chief Secretaryship, was able to say that, having kept Stead in order for three years, he believed he should be able to govern Ireland.

The brief period of partnership with Morley must be regarded as one of the most important in Stead's career. His differences with his chief were largely temperamental; intellectually, the two men had enough ground in common to enable them to collaborate profitably. Morley 'liked the drab men best,' and Stead's mental colouring was never drab. Morley was a Freethinker; Stead was a Christian. Yet Morley, in a letter to his colleague, was able to add 'D.V.' to a promise, and Stead, having 'diligently read up' old issues of the *Fortnightly Review* (which Morley had edited), concluded that he and Morley would agree very well, except on one subject which (no doubt to Morley's surprise) was *not* religion. Stead believed that even on religion they would agree, '*whenever the subject became practical*,' and it turned out that, on the subject on which he thought they disagreed — the moral necessity of abolishing the C.D. Acts — Morley had changed his mind. Both men were big enough to do this; they were living in an infinite universe, and they accepted the possibility of being at times mistaken.

Stead was no philosopher, but he had that in him out of which philosophy grows — a sense of wonder.[1] No theological system, however logically satisfactory, could have put his mind to sleep. He had the Christian hope of immortality but, like Dr. Johnson, he wished for more proofs. Hence the publicity which he gave to what he regarded as evidence for human survival; publicity which took the form of the periodical *Borderland* and the book *Letters from Julia*. Stead no doubt accepted stories which a more critical investigator would have rejected, but his enthusiasm brought the quiet work of the Society for Psychical Research (founded in 1882) into general notice and almost certainly increased the number of serious inquirers.

If Morley had been Stead's chief in 1889, we may be sure that *The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon* would not have appeared in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, nor would Stead have gone to Rome for the purpose of inducing the Pope to make his Church catholic. But Morley had left journalism to become M.P. for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and Stead had been for several years free to go crusading. His attempt to reform, single-handed, the Roman Church was quixotic, but it was not a mere tilting at a windmill.

[1] 'Philosophy is the product of wonder.' A. N. Whitehead, *Nature and Life*.

ittera scripta manet—or has a good chance of remaining—and nough Stead's pamphlet, *The Pope and the New Era*, is hardly nore than journalism of a high order, it will surely be read by istorians a century hence, and comparisons unfavourable to the atican will be drawn between the enthusiastic Englishman's uggestions and the Papal policy which led to the pact with Mussolini.

Enthusiast as he was, Stead must have been aware before he ad been many days in Rome that a radical reform of the Papacy as not to be hoped for. He was convinced that if the Church was o do its part in the making of a better world, the Papal hankering fter temporal power (lost nineteen years before) should cease. hrist's kingdom, he believed, should be *in* the world but not *of* , and his Independent ancestry had not disposed him to regard ith favour what is called a theocracy but which, to Protestant yes, is certainly a totalitarian hierarchy. 'By heredity, by edu- ation, and by the associations of a life-time, he was cut off as by mental and moral abyss from the Church of Rome.' Foxe's *Book of Martyrs* had been his reading in childhood, but in Rome oxe's martyrs were mere heretics—rebels who deserved hat they got. Heresy, which Stead regarded as a sign of ealth, was still feared and hated, and in the year of his arrival n Rome there was fierce indignation in ecclesiastical circles be- ause a monument had recently been erected in the market-place o the heretic Giordano Bruno, whom the Inquisition had con- emned and burnt there in 1600. It was plain enough that the entiment which had inspired a Roman sculptor to represent the destroying angels, full of savage energy, smiting and sparing not s they fell upon the enemies of the Church,' was still dominant n Papal Rome.

He would gladly have co-operated with Rome, despite Rome's npromising record. He was a friend and an admirer of Cardinal Manning, and he believed that Leo the Thirteenth was a Socialist t heart—'a sanctified Socialist . . . bent upon realizing as much ocialism as could be obtained within the limits of the Ten Com- mandments.' But, unfortunately, Leo's Socialism was frustrated y his desire for the restoration of temporal power, and Stead eared that the strength of his desire might tempt the Pope to avour its restoration by means of foreign intervention. Stead, owever, was assured that the Pope was 'utterly and absolutely pposed' to restoration on such terms. On the other hand, the ope was utterly opposed to Stead's alternative—the departure f the Papal Court from Rome. Stead would have removed the Holy See, not only from Rome, but from Southern Europe. He

would have had the religious centre of gravity somewhere in the northern countries, and the common language of the New Era would be — English![2] The whole of the Vatican administration needed modernization. 'A real live editor' should be employed, who 'would not cost as much as a single Nuncio, and be worth more than' all such people. A Congregation for the study of the Social Question should be created, and this body should include women!

Did Stead really think that such a programme had the slightest chance of acceptance? It is probable that he did — before his arrival in Rome, or at any rate before he left Paris on the way thither. On the journey from Paris he had the company of a highly-placed Roman ecclesiastic whose comments on social questions were not such as were likely to raise the Englishman's hopes. The London dockers' strike had just ended, the strike during which the sympathies of Cardinal Manning had been conspicuously on the dockers' side. Manning's attitude had been no doubt one of the factors which had induced Stead to appeal to Manning's supreme spiritual authority. But the ecclesiastic who travelled with Stead had no sympathy to spare for dockers; he would have driven them back to work, regarding negotiations with them as weakness. It was plain that if this man's sentiments represented those of the Pope and Cardinals, Stead's journey had been undertaken in vain. But Stead persisted, and although the appeal of his *Letters from Rome* failed to get a response from the Vatican, and the regaining of temporal power remained the Papal *desideratum*, Stead continued to have hopes of Leo, and a decade later, at the time of the Hague Peace Conference, he again appealed to him for co-operation.

To the cynics of his time most of Stead's crusades were what would nowadays be called 'stunts.' They were spectacular; but good window-dressing is usually a sign of a good shop, and the Hebrew prophets, it is evident, were as careful of the form of their messages as of the contents.

Stead's spectacular journalism differed essentially from 'stunt' journalism in being the outcome of a sincere love for his fellows. Critics who were not cynics may have accused him of extravagance, but extravagance presupposes a mean — a norm — and in moral judgments even the best people find it hard to agree about the mean. Stead shocked many excellent people of the older generation, but he set thousands thinking whose minds were still accessible to new ideas. And he got things done that needed

[2] Or as Stead, in his haste and far from books, wrote: 'the tongue which Milton spoke and Shakespeare wrote.'

oing. *The Maiden Tribute* shocked many and disgusted not a ew, and there were religious people who thought that Stead had ot his deserts when he was sent to Holloway Prison; but his xposure of vice brought about the raising of the age of consent nd the abolition of the C.D. Acts.

There was a great deal of the Cromwellian in Stead. He put is trust in God, but he did not forget to keep his powder dry. He oped that the European nations would some day contrive a olity on the lines of the U.S.A., but while waiting for the United tates of Europe to come into being, he kept a keen eye on his wn country's defences. He was anything but a Little Englander, ut he knew that the existence of a greater England depended on ie strength of the home country. He welcomed all efforts for the urthering of international understanding, but he insisted on the aintenance of a strong Navy. He detested all war, not merely ich wars as those which imperilled the safety of his own country. riend and admirer as he was of Cecil Rhodes, he had no symathy with the British policy which ended in war with the Boer epublics. He lived to see peace in South Africa made secure by ampbell-Bannerman's courageous restoration of self-government the Boers, but not long enough to see the vindication of that t of faith when the enemies of the 1899-1902 war fought side by de in the war of 1914-18.

His popular publications were many; not one of the least interesting was a little volume entitled *Hymns that have Helped e*. In it many well-known people stated which was their favourite ymn. Edward VII, while doubtful whether he was entitled to eal with such an issue, confessed that his favourite hymn was *earer, My God, to Thee*.

Readers of these notes on the activities of an extraordinary an can supplement their knowledge from the excellent *Life of . T. Stead*, by Fred Smyth (London: Jonathan Cape, 2 vols., 925). My personal knowledge of Stead is negligible. I think I w him twice—on an Irish country road as he walked in holiday ood with members of his family, and certainly in the year 1906 Waterloo Station, on the occasion of the arrival of the German litors invited by him to England. The little man was hurrying out among his guests, and at one moment was closely scanning y face. I was not a German editor and no words passed between , but next morning the *Daily News* had a picture perpetuating e only moment in which I stood face to face with the great . T. Stead.

H. R. Chillingworth.

SPIRIT AND SPIRIT

By the Rt. Rev. J. W. Hunkin, D.D., O.B.E., M.C., Bishop of Truro.

There is a spirit in man . . . and the breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding. (*Job* xxxii, 8.)

IN a former paper* I endeavoured to be practical and to look at human experience from an empirical point of view. I tried to give a realistic description of the self and its activities as they appear to me to be. I must now go on to ask what is the reality of which all these are appearances? What *is* the self of which we speak? Here we pass from the realm of Psychology into that of Philosophy. Psychology asks questions about behaviour—how does the self work? Philosophy asks questions about existence—what is the self in its fundamental nature?

It has been the constant aim of Philosophy to reduce the totality of things to one coherent unity. Of recent years Natural Science itself has been moving in that direction. When I was learning Chemistry in the days of my youth I was taught that all chemical substances were built up of a definite number of quite distinct elements. Since those days other elements have been discovered, and the number has been raised to ninety-two occurring in nature, plus two others which scientists themselves have brought into being in connection with the production of the atomic bomb. These elements have now been shown to be all of them composed of a nucleus with attendant electrons. In the atom of hydrogen, for instance, there is a nucleus consisting of one proton charged with positive electricity, and circulating round it one electron 1/1850th of its mass charged with negative electricity. In every element each atom consists of a package containing a nucleus[1] and a number *n* of electrons, the number *n* being different for each element. The method of packing differs from element to element, too. Sir James Jeans has given a fascinating picture of the atom, the smallest unit of each element. Magnify it to the size of a cathedral and what would you see? You would see a small particle (the nucleus), and in a great empty space around it electrons darting like wasps. That picture gives some idea of the relative size of the atom, nucleus and electron, but it is misleading if taken by itself. It is only a representation from one point of view. Other aspects of the stuff and constitution of the atom must be imagined in other ways. A method which takes us further is to conceive of the whole

* *Modern Churchman*, July 1947, pp. 122-134.

[1] The nucleus, which in the hydrogen atom consists of one *proton* only, in other elements consists of *protons* charged with electricity and *neutrons* (without charge). For a brief account see D. S. Evans, *The Science behind the Atomic Bomb*. (*Discovery*, September, 1945.)

omplex as a series of waves; not waves with corks floating upon hem, but waves themselves. And waves are best presented, dened and studied by a series of differential equations. The stream f knowledge is heading unmistakably towards a non-mechanical eality; and, as Sir James Jeans puts it, 'the universe begins to ook more like a great thought than like a great machine.'[2] He dmits, indeed, that modern science has led him to a conclusion not altogether dissimilar' from that of Bishop Berkeley, whose loquent summing up he quotes: 'All the choir of heaven and urniture of earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the ighty frame of the world, have not any substance without the ind . . . So long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do ot exist in my mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must ither have no existence at all or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit.'[3] The objectivity of objects, from that point of iew, arises from their subsisting in the mind of some Eternal pirit, whom Sir James Jeans would have us regard as a mathematician rather than as a biologist or an engineer.

But, of course, such an argument, true as I believe it to be, oes not cause the *prima facie* distinction between mind and natter to disappear. There it *somehow* is; and if what I ordinarily all *thought* is *thought A*, and what I ordinarily call matter is *hought B*, yet *thought A* and *thought B* remain in experience eparated by obvious distinctions. The difference between mind nd matter is still for practical purposes clear and important. The ind is an immaterial element which is more than a mere glow or alo surrounding the brain. None of the theories of the relation etween mind and brain satisfies me. When the mind is thinking ne brain also is active, and the instrument known as the *encephalogram* detects the electric disturbances which arise within the rain during the process of thought. These disturbances take lace inside the skull and must not be regarded as emitting external waves capable of being picked up by other brains after the anner of radar. The record shown by the encephalogram gives definite pattern which is different for each individual. When a erson is sitting relaxed the graph indicates the cells all working ogether like a regiment keeping step. If his attention is roused nd his brain is given some task to do the indicator jumps about, eflecting the movement of the cells in groups undertaking their arious tasks.

Brain surgery has been considerably developed of recent years. atients suffering from persistent depression and mal-adjustment ave been relieved by having portions of the frontal lobes re-

[2] *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 148. [3] *op. cit.*, p. 137.

moved. This operation seems to calm them down. Probably it reduces their capacity for higher intellectual work, but it does not appreciably affect their normal labours or reduce their vitality or expectation of life.

But none of these new results makes it any easier to define the relation between physical brain and immaterial mind. Various partial analogies may help us a little, such as the relation between the nucleus of the cell and the cytoplasm which surrounds it, or the relation between an agent and an instrument; but none of them must be pressed too far.

Considerable attention has been paid of recent years, especially in America and in this country, to the phenomenon of 'extra-sensory perception' (E.S.P.), as Dr. J. B. Rhine has called it. Dr. R. H. Thouless prefers to use the expression 'the psi phenomena'[4] as a term implying no theory as to their nature. These phenomena include what are more commonly known as telepathy and clairvoyance. Professor Broad would prefer to use for both the phrase 'paranormal cognition,' and he and many other investigators recognize that there is now experimental evidence for pre-cognition and for pure clairvoyance as well as for telepathy.[5] Among the well-known experimenters have been Dr. J. B. Rhine and Dr. Thouless (already mentioned), Dr. Soal and Mr. Whatley Carington.[6]

An able and interesting account of 'The Present Position of Experimental Research into Telepathy and Related Phenomena' was given by Dr. Thouless in his Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research in July, 1942. Dr. Thouless sums his own conclusion in these words: 'All that we can reasonably demand is that evidence for psi phenomena should be strong enough for reasonable conviction even for an intrinsically unlikely effect. That point has, I think, been passed, and the reality of the phenomena must be regarded as proved as certainly as anything in scientific research can be proved.'

This is going a good deal further than Dr. William McDougall went in his Presidential Address to the same society in 1920, when he said: 'I believe that telepathy is very nearly established for all time among the facts recognized by science, mainly by the work of this Society. If and when that result shall have been achieved, its importance for science and philosophy will far out-

[4] Originally due to Dr. Wiesner.

[5] See *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, June, 1946: 'Telepathy and Clairvoyance reconsidered.'

[6] Mr. Whatley Carington in 1945 published a book entitled *Telepathy: an outline of its facts, theory and implications*. (Methuen, 12/6.) It was reviewed by Dr. R. H. Thouless in *S.P.R. Proceedings*, 1945.

veigh the sum of achievements of all the psychological laboratories of the universities of two continents.'[7]

Dr. Thouless is not disposed to explain telepathy as due to a kind of radiation from one brain to another. 'An unknown form of radiation,' he says, 'of which we have no knowledge except its action in the psi effect, and an unknown sense organ similarly known only in this way and undetected by anatomical investigation, lack plausibility as scientific hypotheses and can only be regarded as desperate expedients to save the system of scientific expectations.'[8] 'We know of no kind of radiation,' he adds, 'which does not lose its effect with distance.'

It is only fair to say that Dr. Rhine's results have not carried conviction to some of the distinguished scientists who know him. I was able recently to consult a leading statistician who had given some consideration to the subject. He confirmed the correctness of Dr. Rhine's statistical calculations, but was not himself convinced by his conclusions. He thought that the control of such experiments had not so far been sufficiently rigorous,[9] and that mere coincidence was a sufficient explanation of the cases of hallucination collected by the S.P.R. The Society has printed more than 2,000 carefully sifted cases of telepathic apparitions and the like, and has collected many more which have not yet been published.[10]

My own impression is that my friend is too sceptical and that in the present state of our knowledge the most reasonable conclusion is that, under conditions which are still obscure, communication between persons is possible, and does sometimes occur, without any of the ordinary physical means — sound waves, light waves or electric waves.

The appearance of one person to another at a distance when any kind of physical contact is out of the question may be due to some sort of telepathy, or at all events it is a phenomenon of a similar kind. Such appearances are sporadic, spontaneous, uncontrollable, but on rare occasions not without authentication. The best attested on the whole are cases where one of the two persons in communication is at a moment of crisis — as for example near death. Most of us could quote examples no further removed than second-hand. One October Sunday about four years ago I called at a village and found the Vicar, who was a very

[7] Quoted by G. N. M. Tyrrell in his very interesting Presidential Address to the S.P.R. (*S.P.R. Proceedings*, October, 1945.)

[8] Presidential Address, p. 9.

[9] He told me that even Mendel's later results had been 'cooked,' probably by one of his assistants, though that by no means detracted from the greatness of his discovery.

[10] G. N. M. Tyrrell, Presidential Address already quoted.

mouse-like little man, more cheerful than I had known him ever before. That was partly because a brother had come to live with him and he was in good health and no longer lonely as he had been. His mother had died not long before at a very advanced age. Shortly before her death her eldest son (also a parson) had died somewhere up the country. My friend the Vicar had thought that the news of his brother's death had better be kept from her. But to his great surprise his mother already knew. 'A,' she said to him, 'has passed on. I saw him in the room and he told me, and then disappeared through the cupboard.' And the Vicar told me the story so quietly and naturally that it made a great impression on me.

Now let us attempt to obtain a clearer idea of immaterial mind. It is non-material, and therefore if we use picture-language and envisage it as a kind of living cell with a nucleus we must remember that the analogy must not be pressed. But if we may boldly agree with R. G. Collingwood[11] that 'Man as mind is whatever he is conscious of being,' we are justified, I think, in describing the mind as an immaterial complex with a dominating centre. That central nucleus is a spiritual, not a material, nucleus; but as the nucleus is the main factor in determining the nature and life and development of the living cell, so is this central spiritual factor the ruling element of the mind. It is the I, the ego, the personal agent, the subject which does the thinking.

At this point we must pause a moment and inquire what is the right use, or at all events the best use, of the words 'spiritual' and 'spirit.' The word 'mental' is rightly applied to all the phenomena which are properly the concern of Psychology. Psychology examines these phenomena and studies them as a series of events taking place in the mind. To speak of them as *mental* phenomena implies nothing as to their value or as to their essential nature. The word 'spiritual,' on the other hand, has a suggestion of value and also traditionally a suggestion of substance — immaterial substance (if the two words together are not a contradiction in terms). In the Bible the root idea both of the Old Testament word *ruach* and of the New Testament word *pneuma* is *breath.* What left the body at the moment of death was thought of as a kind of breath. 'The dust shall return to the earth as it was and the spirit shall return to God who gave it.' (*Eccles.* xii, 7.) It had a texture of being similar to that of the wind. You could feel it and perceive its effects, but you could not see it. It was therefore regarded as something of quite a different nature from a liquid or a solid. Indeed right down to modern times a gas was

[11] *The New Leviathan,* I, p. 84.

considered to be immaterial in its nature. In popular thought the human spirit was imagined as a sort of wraith or ghost, separable from the body at death. It was for this reason that the use of the word 'spirit' was entirely rejected by sceptical philosophers like Hobbes; and indeed it is still avoided by the natural scientists (including, of course, the psychologists) and handed over to the philosopher, who handles it gingerly, or to the poet, who welcomes it. But the word and what it stands for is certainly part of our religious inheritance and it would be an unjustifiable loss to dispense with it. Let our use of the word start from the same point as the traditional use of it, and let us begin by defining spirit as that which survives the death of the body.

What is the main reason why it seems to me we are bound to believe in life beyond the grave? It is not, to my mind, to be found in the evidence produced by psychical research. Part of this evidence is derived from collecting and sifting what are popularly known as ghost stories and the like: part is obtained through seances with mediums. A good example of the latter was published in 1937 by Lady Barrett under the title *Personality survives Death*.[12] In this book Lady Barrett edits what purport to be communications from the late Sir William Barrett, F.R.S., through the mediumship of Mrs. Osborne Leonard. Chancellor R. J. Campbell contributes a foreword. I saw Chancellor Campbell recently and he told me that he thought the empirical evidence of survival brought forward in this case and others sufficiently convincing. Personally I know far too little about it to express an opinion, and I confess I have no intention of embarking on investigation in this field. I am quite prepared to believe that my father and mother are still interested in their children upon earth, and sometimes I have a vague feeling that somehow they (and especially my mother) are helping. But I am sure that my dear mother would not approve of my trying to get into communication with her through some control on her side of the dividing line and some medium on my side. As to appearances occurring spontaneously, I am always glad to hear of a well-authenticated case (as indeed I have already indicated earlier in this chapter). I am far from thinking that the evidence accumulated in these very numerous stories is negligible: but I am puzzled by it and I do not yet feel called to make up my mind about it.

What really weighs with me is—as I must admit—a theoretical *a priori* argument. I am aware of the danger of such arguments in general, but in this instance I find this particular argument quite convincing. I know of no one who has put the argument more

[12] Longmans.

vividly or more eloquently than Professor Macneile Dixon in his Gifford Lectures[13] published under the title *The Human Situation*. They must be one of the most popular sets of the whole series. The Professor does not write from the Christian standpoint, and that makes all the more striking his unwavering insistence on the absolute necessity of the hope of the life of the world to come.[14] 'If any life beyond the present be denied, you need go no further. The world condemns itself.'[15] If we cherish any kind of expectation of justice for human individuals, then, as Professor Dixon firmly maintains, we are bound to postulate the existence of a future life. It is not enough to say to persons A, B and C, 'You have suffered most unjustly and cruelly, but the world is growing more and more efficient in preventing and doing away with suffering and P, Q, R in the generations after you will not have to suffer so miserably.' It is not fair to A, B and C to leave it like that. Unless the universe is much worse than we take it to be — than we have good reason to take it to be — we have no alternative to assuming that there will be some opportunity in a future life of correcting and compensating for wrongs in this. The argument, no doubt, is abstract and based on a general impression. But I do not think it is merely wishful thinking. I am not, for example, arguing from my own case; for in my own life I have had so much to be thankful for already that I could not complain if I were snuffed out of existence to-morrow. I am trying to make a disinterested moral judgment. The theory that life for human beings ends with the death of the body is too bad, in a universe containing even so much morality as I see in it, to be true. I *must* assume a life to come: I can do no other. And the part of me which survives I call 'spirit.' That part must be enough of me to be the essential me. It must therefore carry with it my character, though how far it will also carry my memory I do not at all know. A crab when it loses a claw soon, I believe, grows another. There must survive enough of me to grow again anything that is lost but is really necessary to my being.

But let us consider this postulate of spirit a little more closely. If it exists at all then it must be, or at least be intimately associated with, that element in man which sits on the saddle-back of the specious present, and is not itself wholly — if at all — in the space-time continuum.

Everything in the physical order, the order of space-time, may be determined. The indeterminacy which physicists have discovered within the atom may after all be no real indeterminacy. And even if the mass or motion of the electron is in some sense

[13] Delivered in the University of Glasgow, 1935-1937; reprinted eight times. [14] See especially pp. 423-436. [15] p. 423.

indeterminate, yet averaging out in the mass, the effect in the motion and material with which we are familiar in the ordinary dimensions of the world is an effect indistinguishable from determined effect. At all events Einstein and Plank are determinists. According to them everything in the physical order, the order of space-time, is determined, and our own sense of freedom is an illusion. That, however, is a dictum which I am totally unable to accept. I am directly and immediately conscious of a certain real degree of freedom and power of choice. I act and think as though I am, at least to some extent, free. I cannot help so acting and thinking: and, in practice, in actual experience, no one else can. Yet I do not feel that I am in a position to deny that determinism holds so far as the events and sequences in the time-space continuum are concerned.

There is, of course, no contradiction here if we postulate, as I have done, the existence in the very centre of my being of an element which I have called spirit which is immaterial and timeless. Again, if I may assume, as indeed I must, that, essentially, other persons are very similar in constitution to myself, they also, in their central core, are spirit. And if that spirit is of the same stuff (though stuff is hardly the word) as my own, that will explain the deep-seatedness of our relationships and affinities.

For instance, it is of the very nature of mind to think. Whatever my mind *is*, what it *does* is to *think*. Thinking, as Plato said, is dialogue within the soul; and in order to think coherently we need language. But language I learn from other people, and I learn it with the assistance of my ears and of my mouth. So that not only is my mind bound up with my body in an indescribably intimate way, but mentally I have been dependent upon and moulded by other people to an extraordinary degree. Indeed if I examine my inner life closely I find it difficult to separate what is me and mine from what is you and yours, and what is they and theirs. It looks as though we are much more separate entities in body than we are in mind.

And what shall we say of spirit? The relatedness of man with man goes deep. 'All reality,' writes Gerald Bullett, 'is shared reality: to be solitary, imprisoned in self, is to be less than real.'[16] 'My experience,' said the late Mr. Clutton Brock, 'is not utterly mine until it is shared, nor am I utterly myself until I am one with other selves in a relation like that of notes in a tune.'[17] Mr. Clutton Brock is here speaking of general rather than special relatedness. There is a special relatedness between spirits which, perhaps quite suddenly, discover one another, and become conscious of deep and close affinity. Spiritual communion then be-

[16] *Problems of Religion*, p. 88. [17] In *The Spirit*, ed. B. H. Streeter, p. 345.

comes inter-penetrating, uniting, intimate, and both persons find fresh vitality and stability, a new satisfaction and fulfilment.

Such experiences confirm the suggestion that human spirits are all of the same spiritual stuff, arranged in distinct patterns which form the individual nuclei of selves. Among these, certain patterns have a special attraction for one another.

That is all I have to say at present with regard to the human spirit. Let us now ask how we can best think of the Divine Spirit.

The first paragraph of the Bible refers to the Spirit of God brooding upon the face of the primordial waters (*Gen.* i, 2); the penultimate paragraph of the Bible begins with the words 'And the Spirit and the bride say come' (*Rev.* xxii, 17). As has already been stated, the notion conveyed by both the Old Testament word *ruach* and the New Testament word *pneuma* is that of *wind* or *breath*. When a man breathes his last, out of him goes his vital-breath or spirit. And as this spirit came to be regarded as the highest element in the complex being of man, so by analogy a similar rôle was attributed to the Spirit of God. Such is the conception behind St. Paul's argument in *I Cor.* ii, 11 : 'Who among men knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of the man, which is in him? even so the things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God.' At the same time the word 'spirit' retained a connotation of 'immaterial stuff.' The wind was thought to be of that character : it was invisible and yielding (not hard and solid like wood or stone), yet it could be felt, and its effects were unmistakable. Posidonius about 100 B.C. was as far as we know the first to say in Greek that God is spirit, thus anticipating by half-a-dozen generations the author of the Fourth Gospel. (*Jn.* iv, 24.)

The Fourth Gospel is the last word in the creative thinking of the New Testament era, and behind it lies the experience of the first two generations of Christians. What is central in that experience is a new sense of spiritual power. 'The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has made me free from the law of sin and death.' (*Rom.* viii, 2). The source of this new spiritual power they held to be the Spirit of God, the same Spirit of the Lord which came upon Gideon (*Judges* vi, 34), upon Bezalel (*Exodus* xxxi, 1, 2), upon Micah (iii, 8) and the prophets (*Num.* xi, 29). This same Spirit Christ claimed to be upon Himself (*Lk.* iv, 18, 21), and the Christians recognized that the Spirit influencing them was no other than the Spirit of Christ. 'God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying Abba, Father.' (*Gal.* iv, 6.)

Neither the Fourth Gospel nor any other book in the New Testament is a treatise of metaphysics, and words are used poetically and in close accordance with their popular use rather than philosophically. But the Fourth Gospel seems to give a further

nterpretation to the experience of Christians.

The writer starts from the conviction that God is Spirit and hat Jesus had received from God the Spirit in fullness as con-rasted with the prophets of old who had received the Spirit in iverse portions. This was the significance of the vision of John he Baptist at the baptism of Jesus: 'Upon whom thou shalt see ne Spirit descending and abiding upon him, the same is he . . . And I have seen and have borne witness that this is the Son of God.' (i, 33, 34.)

That did not mean that it was at the moment of baptism that esus received this fullness of Spirit (iii, 34). When He came nto the world and took upon Him the raiment of flesh He came as ne Word, the Logos, who was with God and was God. This term Word, Logos, lay near the hand of the Evangelist as a term used n this rather technical and special sense in certain circles of nought. He uses the word in the prologue to his gospel, but in nat sense he never uses it again. After all he has no need of it. nd 'spirit' is the more familiar and expressive word among hristians. What they were so vividly conscious of was a new elease of Spirit, a Presence now released in such a way as to put ll former experience of it into the shade. Hence that paradoxical entence in *Jn.* vii, 39, 'the Holy Ghost was not yet; because Jesus as not yet glorified.' Hence also the tremendous stress on the pirit as another Strengthener (Paraclete), who is yet not other, in nat magnificent discourse of the glorified Son (xvii, 1) in chapters iv-xvii.

The Athanasian Creed says that we are to believe in the rinity 'neither confounding the Persons; nor dividing the Sub-tance.' Dr. Wheeler Robinson has suggested that we might ex-ress the truth more clearly by substituting the word 'presence' or the word 'person' and the word 'spirit' for the word 'sub-tance'[18]—'neither confounding the Presences; nor dividing the pirit.' Certainly we are at this point conscious of the poverty of ur language, and we feel we are stretching language almost urther than it will go.

The fact is that the deeper we penetrate into the mystery of eing the more we realize the limitations of our own power of ision and apprehension. We can only see one aspect at a time. hat will not seriously matter if we recognize our partial views as artial and do not mistake them for the whole.

Thus it must surely be true to say that there is in man some-ning that is really divine, and if there were not, there could not e any intercourse between man and God.[19] In prayer and wor-

[18] *The Christian Experience of the Holy Spirit*, p. 281.

[19] See F. C. Burkitt, *Christian Worship*, p. 135.

ship we open and lift up our hearts to God so as to let that atom of the divine nature within us coalesce in thought and feeling 'with the Reality which underlies everything.'[20] As we can foster and develop fellowship with other spirits, so also we can seek more and deeper communion with God. And not only in worship and aspiration but in practical life. 'The effort in men to think and act in obedience to the voice of duty within them,' says Lionel Curtis, 'is itself communion with God.'[21] Bernard Bosanquet defines the spiritual life as 'oneness with the Supreme Good in every facet of the heart and will.'[22]

Hence there is a special appropriateness in the rite of Confirmation as the sequel to and the completion of the rite of Baptism. Baptism has long been normally infant baptism. After the admission of the child by birth into its new environment of the world, it is natural that there should be no long delay in the admission of the child by baptism into the environment of Christian fellowship. And then when the child reaches the years of discretion and should naturally stand upon his own feet and take responsibility upon himself, whither shall we direct his attention? Surely to the Spirit of God in communion with whom his own spirit will be quickened and purified and reinforced. The Confirmation Service is centred on the Bishop's prayer, 'Defend, O Lord, this thy child with thy heavenly grace that he may continue thine for ever and daily increase in the Holy Spirit more and more until he come unto thy everlasting Kingdom.'

It will be observed that the development of our theme has brought us on from the consideration of the Spirit of God to the consideration again of the spirit of man, and still further to the study of the relation between the two. We are now in a position to attempt to outline a picture. We must not expect it to represent the whole truth. It will suffice if it depicts one aspect of it. Let us then picture the human spirit as a patterned unit, not discrete and isolated from other such units, and all emanating from one great spiritual source and not severed from that source. 'The secret solidarity of the human race we cannot escape from,' says Professor Radhakrishnan; 'it cannot be abolished by the passing insanities of the world.'[23] That solidarity is due to the fact that each spirit is brought into being by the creative activity of the one Spirit. That one Spirit is evidently actuated by a will to variety, and creates various creators. Unless creators are created nothing is created; but creators are created, shot off like sparks, but unlike sparks not broken off and detached from the parent fire. 'In him we live and move and have our being'—St. Paul's reminis-

[20] *ibid.*, p. 143. [21] *Civitas Dei*, iii, 44. [22] *What Religion Is*, p. 32.
[23] *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, p. 32.

nce of the Cretan poet is right. (*Acts* xvii, 28.) The creation of eators would appear to be the main purpose of the universe : the oduction and development of spirits in association with each her and in communion with their Creator. I do not go so far as say that this is the only purpose manifested in the universe. The lany-twinkling smile of ocean and the white breakers on the own rocks of an uninhabited island are in themselves worth hile, though no human eye ever sees them. Moreover there are her creatures of real value as well as man.

In each individual man, spirit is the same in substance — if we ay for a moment make use of that difficult word now largely scarded both by Philosophy and Physics — but distinctly and niquely patterned. Each spirit and all spirits together are inparable from the Divine Spirit apart from whom they would fall to nothingness and dissolution.

Such a philosophical conception throws light back upon hristian doctrine. Traditional Christian doctrine is a summary, onstructed to assist the memory and aid the understanding, of hat the Bible teaches about God, ourselves, and the world. It is at, rather than a philosophical construction. But it seems to me at the philosophical conception at which we have arrived in this napter brings a very welcome illumination and even some degree explanation to Christian doctrine.

As an example let us consider the great range of religious ersonalities. Some are outstanding : we may refer to them as ligious geniuses. But it is not that spirit in them is in essence fferent from spirit elsewhere. It is different in degree and ttern ; and after a certain point difference in degree and pattern comes for practical purposes a difference in kind.

No one would mistake nitrogen for copper. Yet each is made simply and solely of one nucleus and a number of electrons. he number of electrons is different, and their arrangement within e atom is different. And the practical result is that they are fferent elements, quite different in kind. The illustration is sugestive in connection with the doctrine of the Person of Christ, ough its implications must be followed with caution.

Our philosophical conception also has a bearing upon our life nd conduct here and now. If the nucleus of the human mind is meless immaterial eternal spirit, that spirit, like Divine Spirit s infinite source and inexhaustible fountain, is immortal : imortal of course. But the pattern of spirit in me may be improved nd refined, and my life here in the world is designed for its evelopment. The process no doubt will be continued hereafter, it the more that can be accomplished in the here and now the tter.

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

By Geddes MacGregor, D.Phil.

THE name of Jean-Paul Sartre has been for some time very much on the tip of the tongue in the Paris cafés. It has also received considerable attention in England, further stimulated by M. Sartre's recent visit to London on the occasion of the performance of two of his plays. The French existentialist movement with which it has come to be associated is of indisputable importance and vitality. Many of the leading philosophers, such as Louis Lavelle of the Collège de France and René Le Senne of the Sorbonne, are happy to be called existentialists, and Père Daniélon, S.J., has rightly called existentialism the most living element in contemporary French thought. It was influencing the intellectual life of France when M. Sartre was an unknown schoolmaster, and it may fairly be said that Marxism and Neo-Thomism are now practically its only serious rivals there.

But M.Sartre's meteoric success has been literary rather than philosophical, as he himself would probably be eager to admit. He is an imaginative of a high order rather than a philosopher. That professional philosophers in France, practically without exception, should have refused to take him very seriously is probably not surprising even to M. Sartre, for academic circles in France are necessarily somewhat conservative; this is the price that has to be paid for the vivacious current of French intellectual life, for when such life abounds—and M. Sartre would be the first to insist that his existentialism is a current of thought rather than a philosophic system—it is impossible always to take it seriously. Philosophy and letters meet each other at closer quarters than is usual with us, and sometimes influence each other very rapidly; nevertheless this involves not less but greater discrimination on the part of those for whom philosophy is a serious business.

Even in the sphere of his immediate influence, however, M. Sartre has evoked strong opposition. This is certainly not only because of his emphatic atheism, for France is well accustomed to atheists; Marxists no less than Catholics find him distasteful. He accuses his opponents of *mauvaise foi*; but the most sincere inquirer nurtured in the intellectual tradition of the Latin races could not but find difficulty with a book such as '*L'Etre et le Néant*, with over 700 pages heavy with the philosophic jargon of Martin Heidegger, to whose thought M. Sartre confesses a large debt. M. Sartre can be sometimes curiously un-French when he

ilosophizes, and also does not scruple, when challenged with consistency, to explain that an earlier statement was for more lgar ears. His views are expressed in many books,[1] but it is ubtful to what extent his philosophic discourses are read; ubtless no more than other works of this kind. Certainly it is s plays and novels, it is *Rocambole* and *Fantômas*, that have n him his fame.

To a very large number of readers M. Sartre appears to debase dically the most ordinary human ideals of love and friendship, d to present us with the worst side of human life. Writers who this must always expect to shock people. Yet Valéry was obably somewhat bored rather than shocked when he exclaimed a judgment on M. Sartre's work, '*Quelle étonnante cochonrie!*' M. Sartre himself relates how a lady, having inadvertently lowed a coarse expression to pass her lips, apologized, saying, think I must have become an existentialist.' That M. Sartre's aracters are popular though fortunately not typical human ings need not surprise anyone, of course. Psychologists know at we tend to be fascinated by that which is opposite and, ychologically speaking, complementary to the self we have veloped. Stories of horror naturally enthral the normal human ing because they are about people different from him and exriences unlike his, while on the other hand simple and lovely rings often appeal to perverts; garden flowers may interest iminal types. Nothing could be more unfair than that we should ndemn M. Sartre because his writings shock people who are not ocked by, say, Zola or Maupassant. So let us consider his more plicit accounts of his thought.

Existentialism is not in itself either favourable or unfavourble to theism. Kierkegaard was acutely religious, and Gabriel arcel is known to be very strongly Catholic. When it does not d God, however, it tends to yield one of the grimmest of all heistic world-views, perhaps, let us concede, because it is in a nse more honest and thorough-going than many other kinds of heism; even from a theistic standpoint is sees vividly at least a lf-truth about the mystery of life, though theists would generly call this the tragic half. Nietzsche, who has many affinities th existentialism, spoke of the noble freedom atheism brings, d it is noteworthy that M. Sartre, as we shall see presently, has

[1] These include *La Nausée, Le Mur, Huis Clos, L'Imaginaire, Les emins de la liberté* (Gallimard); *L'Imagination* (Presses Universitaires); *quisse d'une théorie des émotions* (Herrmann); *L'Existentialisme est un manisme* (Nagel); *Réflexions sur la question juive* (Paul Morihien). The t was published in February, 1947.

a good deal to say about freedom. Heidegger, the German thinker, from whom M. Sartre has drawn much inspiration, inclined rather to the view that man is a wretched tragedy, and M. Sartre is eager to exonerate himself from the charge of pessimism which is naturally made against him, for the French intellectual temper is incurably optimistic and would not for long be willing to settle down to the kind of fare with which a Heidegger might satisfy disciples among his German compatriots.

That there is no God is axiomatic for M. Sartre, and yet he claims that his existentialism is not so atheistic as to be exhausted by showing that God does not exist. On the contrary, God is not the problem: 'even if God existed, it would change nothing.'[2] God could not help, thinks M. Sartre, for 'man must . . . persuade himself that nothing can save him from himself, even a valid proof of the existence of God.' All this is fairly familiar. But neither does M. Sartre believe in man. '*L'homme n'existe pas.*'[3] There is no soul, but only a body, which gives off, however, a sort of phosphorescent glow, perhaps somehow like the 'astral body' which theosophical clairvoyants claim to see around the bodies of human beings, announcing by its changing hues their passions and emotions, or analogous to the aureole or nimbus seen by artists around the heads of the saints. Radium gives off a glow, and gold, silver and precious stones scintillate in certain circumstances, so why not other fine matter such as the central nervous system?

What does M. Sartre mean when he says that man does not exist? He is defending the existentialist thesis that 'existence precedes essence.' It has been traditionally held in philosophy that as there can be no predicate without a subject, existence must always be existence of something, and this thing, since it is to exist, can never be an impossibility — a triangular octagon, for instance. Before existing it must have the possibility of existing; it must not be nothing; that is, it must have 'essence,' and so 'essence' is said to precede 'existence.' When the modern existentialists deny this they imply, for instance, that not only have I nothing in common with any other man by reason of our both being men (there is no 'humanity'), but I have not even anything in common with myself as I was or shall be: I am perpetually changing and am not to be identified either with the man I was at twenty or the man I shall be at fifty.

M. Sartre naturally opposes the view that was commonly held in the past that God makes man from a pattern in the divine mind as a silversmith makes a teapot from a design in his head. But

[2] *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*, p. 95. But see p. 35.
[3] *Réflexions sur la question juive*, p. 187.

hen Diderot and the other eighteenth-century atheists abolished ıe idea of God they did not go far enough for M. Sartre, for they tained, in the notion of a universal concept 'man,' the idea of a ıman essence preceding human existence. On the old humanist ew, Nero, Plato and the village idiot, though differing widely, ave all something in common: they are human. M. Sartre would ot approve of this way of looking at the question. Man is nothing n advance,' nothing *a priori*; he is nothing but what he makes mself. Such is the first principle of existentialism.' He is '*un rojet*,' and he will be 'what he will have planned to be, not what e will want to be.'[4] This, as M. Sartre admits, is a hard doctrine r the unsuccessful; but the point is that there is no use in my ying to balance my failures by referring to my ideals and aspira- ons, or the dignity of the humanity in which, as a man, I share, ith all the grandeur this implies. It implies nothing, for it is othing: I am no more and no less than what I have made myself. he consequences of this view are far-reaching. The spirit that spired the democratic movements of the past loses its main undation. The kind of view which decried inequality as the out- me of belief in a God whose function seemed to be to 'keep us our proper stations,' and which stressed the innate dignity of an as the basis of universal suffrage, for instance, would seem to ave no secure ground, since man does not even exist except to ıe extent to which he builds himself.

If man has no soul but only a body which gives off a sort of osphorescent glow, what of our consciousness? In *L'Etre et le éant* M. Sartre tells us that it 'is the body,' yet it is 'nothing ubstantial, it is a pure appearance, in the sense that it exists only the extent to which it appears.' It is therefore presumably sup- osed to be somewhat like the rainbow or the glitter of diamonds. s it then the 'phosphorescence'? But what kind of phosphores- ence, what kind of rainbow, appears to itself, being self-conscious? Ve look again and find that '*le pour-soi en tant qu'il n'est pas soi t une présence à soi qui manque d'une certaine présence à soi c'est en tant que manque de cette présence qu'il est présence à oi.*' This enigmatic observation turns out to be neither as clever r as absurd as one might at first suppose it to be, but rather a uism somewhat to this effect: 'to apprehend self is to become th the onlooker and the object looked at; it means artificially litting oneself into subject and object for the purpose of making examination; it is therefore to exchange the ordinary mode of ıe self's presence, the coincidence of subject and object, for a lit mode which does not coincide with the total self.' In other

[4] *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*, p. 22 f.

words, introspection is untrustworthy, perhaps impossible. How then do we have awareness of ourselves at all? We read that 'consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is.' Self-analysis is to be distrusted because of the 'distance' between my thought and myself; it exhibits not the fruit but only the worm in the fruit.

The *nausée* which in our circumstances is the best response to life sometimes seems to be exalted to the point of becoming the Sartrian counterpart of Christian salvation or Buddhist enlightenment. Our position in the world could not be more ridiculous; not only are we put into it for nothing; we know ourselves to be *de trop* in a world which is itself *de trop*. Evidently we may hope to be a little less *de trop*, a little less ridiculous, by putting out our tongue at life than either by accepting it or by running away from it. For suicide is no way out; if it is absurd that we should be born, it is no less absurd that we should die. From the viewpoint of a writer such as Santayana, death may be shown to be less fearful than it is often depicted. This writer has said in an essay entitled *A Long Way Round to Nirvana*,[5] 'That the end of life should be death may sound sad: yet what other end can anything have? The end of an evening party is to go to bed; but its use is to gather congenial people together, that they may pass the time pleasantly. An invitation to the dance is not rendered ironical because the dance cannot last for ever . . . The transitoriness of things is essential to their being, and . . . becomes sad by virtue of a sentimental illusion.' But M. Sartre has little room for such a view, it would seem. Exalting the idea of human loneliness and appealing to the fiercest kind of individualism, he shows death *jeté là, comme ça*, a stark reality, containing the possibility of further bonds. Heidegger held that living in the light of death is authentic existence, heroic existence; the Christian existentialist looks to God to give meaning to both the enigma of life and that of death; but for M. Sartre there seems to be no respite in one or the other. There is a curiously religious turn underlying his atheism: the anguish we have to undergo in attaining our self-realization is the anguish of knowing that, while we have to build up our own lives for ourselves, failure is, in a sense, inevitable. Yet we must build, certain of failure.

This anguish is an important existentialist theme, connected with the fundamental conception of Nothingness. For Heidegger, Dread (*Angst*), the sense of being on the verge of Nothing, represents a great instrument of knowledge. The essence of Dread

[5] George Santayana, *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1933), IV, p. 98.

cording to Heidegger, is Concern (*Sorge*) which tends to be obscured by losing our selfhood in the cares of ordinary living. ny experiences which shock us, which jolt us out of our com-lacency, tend to remedy our miserable state. For M. Sartre, nsciousness, which is not what it is, and is what it is not, may be nsidered to be a sort of lacuna between that part of me which bserves and that part which is observed, a fissure which is simply thing. But though consciousness is nothing, Nothingness is idently something, for it is the father of *Angoisse* (Heidegger's *ngst*).[6] Nor is this the end of the paradox; consciousness is en-nared in *le visqueux*, which is the past, the world, the 'Thou' of e 'I-Thou' arrangement familiar to readers of Professor Martin uber. I am '*jeté là, comme ça*' (this is a favourite Sartrian hrase); but so also is the *visqueux*, encircling me, threatening me. he problem of who 'threw out' all these things is not one which ncerns M. Sartre. Yet he is eager to portray his view of life as eative rather than nihilistic.

The moral consequences of Sartrian existentialism are im-rtant. It is impossible for me to choose evil; what I choose is ways good; and in choosing it I tacitly declare it good for all hers too.[7] My responsibility is immense, and the problem it pre-nts is to be solved in the light of a typically existentialist con-eption, anguish. In making a moral choice, we are confronted lith the question, 'What if everybody acted in this way?' The an who says lightly, 'But everybody doesn't,' is ill at ease with imself. The anguish which everyone feels is that of Abraham mmanded to slay his son: if he could have been sure that it was ally an angel of God who instructed him, he need not have rried. In making our choices we have to experience the anguish f making far-reaching decisions, and if we say we do not experi-nce this anguish it is only because we pretend not to, deceiving rhaps even ourselves. M. Sartre is eager to show that here his iew leads not to quietism but to its opposite. This anguish, which bound up with responsibility, 'is not a curtain which would eparate us from action, but is part of the action itself.'[8]

The foregoing situation is bound up with the Sartrian view hich demands a more coherent atheism than has hitherto been chieved. He is much opposed to what he calls the 'lay ethic'

[6] No English word fully translates *Angst*, though I think 'anguish' comes ear it. It expresses metaphysical insecurity rather than anxiety about any-ing in particular. What we come up against is meaninglessness, for Sartre e final metaphysical fact.

[7] *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*, pp. 26 ff.

[8] *ibid.*, p. 33.

which, while setting aside God, tries to establish *a priori* moral values and obligations, writing them up, as it were, across a godless sky. French radicalism, as M. Sartre acutely perceives, asked, 'What difference would it make to honesty, progress and so forth if God didn't exist?' Deciding that it would make none at all, it had no qualms about abolishing God as somewhat superfluous. As Kierkegaard might have said, these humanists, having first conceived God as in their employment, and having found him redundant, dismissed him. 'The existentialist, on the contrary,' says M. Sartre, 'thinks it very annoying that God does not exist, because with him disappears all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven,'[9] and has to repudiate all *a priori* ideas, moral as well as theological. M. Sartre reminds us of Dostoevsky's remark: 'If God didn't exist, everything would be allowable.' This is in fact the situation; man is relieved of all predetermined obligations; nevertheless he has, on the other hand, no longer anything to turn to, anyone to whom he may go to ease the burden of his responsibilities. So 'man is free, man is freedom'; but just because of this he has decisions to make, and must make them alone with no excuse to fall back on; he is always like an army officer acting in an emergency without direction from any superior authority, obliged to take his own initiative, which may involve, for example, the lives of hundreds of other men.

This is an aspect of M. Sartre's thought which has a counterpart in practically all types of existentialism, Christian or otherwise, and M. Sartre is probably right to this extent in defending his philosophy from the charge of pessimism. His ethic has a distinctly optimistic character in its way. But, having excluded God, and insisted that this implies a greater individual responsibility than was otherwise involved, he very logically excludes the principle of love, so that his ethic is radically egoistic. Even the most primitive altruism, whether in general human companionship or in sexual love between man and woman, is repudiated. If, as I have suggested, disgust is the Sartrian equivalent of Christian salvation, the existence of others is the counterpart of the Fall. I recognize such existence when I come up against the fact of my own being; in my *malaise* I see others *jetés là*, like myself; they are part of the *visqueux*, menacing me. In his recent book on the Jewish question, for instance, M. Sartre ignores altogether the possibility of solving the problem by any development of a sense of human comradeship. In his final counsel to his disciples he warns them not to appeal to 'Aryan generosity'; '*chez le meilleur cette vertu est à éclipses.*' He proposes instead an appeal to their

[9] *ibid.*, p. 35.

lfish interests. But this must be his final court of appeal in all oral questions. That human love and companionship should ave a physical basis is a view to which psychologists have for ng accustomed us; nor is such an outlook incompatible with a ry high view of the significance of human love, since from the hristian standpoint this depends not on its origin but on the lue emerging with it; but that we should affirm the existence of hers only because they confront us as useful or dangerous ob-cts is not a convincing picture of even the most humdrum and rdid human experience.

But M. Sartre's view of life, though artistically fascinating, as as Nietzsche's, is hardly ever intellectually convincing. In the *éflexions sur la question juive* neither his Jews nor his anti-mites are very lifelike. Though rightly unwilling that his ought should be politically labelled, he seems so eager to prove e Left right in this matter that he yields to extravagant neralizations such as that antisemitism is a '*bourgeois* repre-ntation of the class-struggle' which 'could not exist in a class-ss society.' He is ready to see it as a sexual phenomenon — sex always *cette immense affaire* — and would have us believe that ren the term *belle juive* has a sinister, peculiarly sexual signifi-nce absent from terms such as *belle Grecque* or *belle Améri-ine*.[10] Having recited instances of her sexual degradation in me novels, he concludes that there is no need of further evidence *our marquer la valeur de symbole sexuel que prend la Juive ns le folklore*.' Likewise we are told that the case of the carica-res of Jews in antisemitic journals are quite different from, say, e caricatures of *bourgeois* in proletarian journals. To the prole-rian, that which makes the *bourgeois* is his position as such, that to say, 'an assembly of external factors'; the *bourgeois* is a nthetic unity of manifestations which may be revealed externally, d the assembly is made up of acts of conduct (*conduites*). The ntisemite, on the other hand, sees in the Jew only Jewishness *uiverie*), a property or principle, like phlogiston or opium. The stinction is not that, of two classes, *bourgeois* (of which anti-mites form a subclass) and Jews, one is more human that the her; for neither ought strictly to be called human at all, since ere is no such thing as human nature—man does not exist, except *une passion inutile*; he is absurd. Both classes are social pheno-ena. Yet while M. Sartre would deplore my action if I abused ews, he would evidently condone it if I abused *bourgeois*, on the round that the latter class is an assembly of external factors while

[10] *Réflexions sur la question juive*, p. 61.

the former is a principle.'[11] He does not want Jews assimilated; he wants them to have rights as Jews, reminding us that feminine suffrage does not require women to change their sex in order to vote; they are admitted to suffrage as women, with all that this implies in point of view. This sounds reasonable enough; but M. Sartre is far from giving *bourgeois* the privileges he claims for Jews. Moreover, he ignores the racial as much as the religious problem recognizing no racial principles, remaining agnostic about the possibility of inheriting the psychological qualities of one's race, and asking us to think rather in terms of the 'biological, psychic and social phenomena' in a 'synthetic spirit.' The Jews are not a race; they are a phenomenon. As for the antisemite, '*destructeur par fonction, sadique au cœur pur*,' he is fundamentally a criminal. Evidently he is not even worthy of the privileges of a social phenomenon.

One might pass over much of what M. Sartre says on this question — it is not devoid of truth — and even his astonishingly ingenuous footnote in which, in two short sentences, he informs us that Christ was put to death not by the Jews but by the Romans.[12] It is when he tries to shock his readers, to rouse their moral indignation against antisemitic or other evil behaviour, that one must protest that, taught by M. Sartre to expect selfish behaviour from everybody, one can no longer be shocked at anything. Can any conduct ever again evoke one's strong moral indignation? Here is the core of the ethical difficulty in Sartrianism.

Probably the most readable little book M. Sartre has written by way of directly expounding his existentialist thought is *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*, which is based on a lecture he delivered to the Club Maintenant in Paris and to which is appended an interesting discussion which took place when he later gave the opportunity to some Marxists and others to state their objections to his doctrine. In this little book he would seem to come nearest to establishing the proposition set forth in its title when he explains how there may be said to be a universal humanity, though not one which is in any sense 'given'; it is

[11] Incidentally, M. Sartre exempts the following from the class '*bourgeois*': engineers, entrepreneurs and scholars; their professions, he maintains, are close to the proletariat, and in any case they are not often antisemitic (*ibid.*, p. 46 n.)

[12] The footnote (*ibid.*, p. 86) reads: 'Notons tout de suite qu'il s'agit ici' (he refers to the notion that the Jew is Christ's assassin) 'd'une légende créée par la propagande chrétienne de la diaspora. Il est bien évident que la croix est un supplice *romain* et que le Christ a été exécuté *par les Romains* comme agitateur politique.' The italics are M. Sartre's.

perpetually built. I build the universal in choosing myself.' But his is hardly humanism in the traditional sense of the term.

M. Sartre does well to relate his ethics to aesthetics. Moral choice, he says, is to be compared with a work of art. He hastens to assure us that there is no question of a *morale esthétique*, but that he merely wants to remind us that an artist is not reproached because he paints a picture without reference to *a priori* rules—what matters is the finished canvas—and that so it should be in the moral field. Aesthetic values arise in the coherence of the picture itself, as it is being painted. M. Sartre would like us to believe that in the case of morality there is exactly the same creative situation. Morality and art have this in common: they are both creative and both inventive. This brings us to a common objection to Sartrianism, that values lose their seriousness, since they have to be invented. To this objection M. Sartre, reminding us that his main concern is to state the results of a coherent atheism, replies: 'I'm very annoyed that it's so; but if I've suppressed God the Father, there must be somebody to invent values.'[13]

The individualist emphasis which characterizes all types of existentialism takes some curious turns. In the hands of the Christian Kierkegaard, for instance, it led to a vigorous protest against religious individualism opposed to the Christian community, the Church. For though Kierkegaard stressed the individualist approach to God, this was not to be an end in itself, as envisaged by Lutheran individualism. It is true that when, with macabre prophetic insight, he anticipated a war 'not merely European' his eccentric fancy depicted a vision of an enormous 'exhibition of worship' with 100,000 musicians, 50,000 elected deputies and 1,000,000 clerical 'hirelings,' all appointed to supplicate God officially; but God ignores it all, preferring the sigh of a poor man stalking down the High Street with a sincere heart. It is the latter who has access to God. That the mob should constitute the church was a view so repugnant to Kierkegaard that he could find no language vitriolic enough to describe his abhorrence of it. But on the other hand he wanted to disintegrate the mob so that by disintegration it might become more individual, and by becoming more individual be capable of reintegration into a true Church. His objection to the religion he knew in the Church of Denmark was that it assumed no authority to teach the mob, being rather the mob's tool. Though M. Sartre's outlook has also a very strong individualistic flavour such as should appeal to many, not least in France, it is doubtful what meaning it has in the long run. What

[13] *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*, p. 89.

is the use of individualism in a world in which there is no love, no individuals but individual *salauds*, a world which is not even as meaningful as the bad joke of some malignant demon? Despite M. Sartre's able attempt to sweeten the pill it would seem that there is not much left for us to be individualistic about, except the form that our *nausée* shall take.

A Marxist interrogator asked M. Sartre whether he might not be reviving Radical Socialism. This paradoxical view was suggested by the fact that the many facets of Sartrianism seemed to this questioner to converge in the direction of the old-fashioned liberal humanism which was the essence of Radical Socialism. The present state of the world, though unfavourable to liberalism of the old kind, might admit, it was suggested, the new, tortured, anguished liberalism to which M. Sartre seemed to open the way. From an orthodox Marxist point of view this may be good enough, as a caricature of Sartrianism; but if so, it is good enough only because to a Marxist liberalism is anarchy. After all, M. Sartre's defence of his atheistic existentialism as a humanism is little better than a *jeu de mots*. It is doubtless true that he would oppose the *doctrinaire* in every form; but the full political expression of M. Sartre's philosophy, which he insists is a current of thought rather than a system, would surely be anarchy. This is no condemnation of the cogency of his view of life; on the contrary, Sartrianism may be a much more satisfactory application of agnostic principles than that of either Comte or Marx, as anarchy may be a more rational outcome of atheism than atheistic Liberalism or atheistic Communism. But what M. Sartre may be tempted to forget is that the old-fashioned atheists and agnostics were not always so certain as he professes to be that there is no evidence of the existence of God. He admits being ready to water down his doctrine for the benefit of weaker digestions, and one must suspect that for the strongest nerves he would be willing to offer an even grimmer picture of life than he has so far painted. It is this which would interest Christians even more than what he has already achieved, the value of which is due less to the vigorous opposition it has evoked from so many quarters (often making strange bedfellows of his adversaries) and the too ready currency his views have enjoyed among a wide and by no means uncritical public, than to the fact that he shows us to some extent whither atheism may go under an existentialist banner, while being at the same time parasitic on genuine theism.

THE DYNAMIC OF PRAYER

By Raymond C. Knox, Chaplain-Emeritus of Columbia University.

It is said that when Emerson preached his first sermon he selected as his text, 'Pray without ceasing' (*1 Thess.* v, 17), and that he divided his discourse under these two heads: first, 'all prayers come true,' and, second—concluding with a caution which possibly showed his New England upbringing—'therefore be careful what you pray for.'

If this treatment strikes us as unexpected and strange, is it because we have not invariably received that for which we prayed, and have we always been careful as to what we prayed for? When we assemble and meet together to ask those things which are requisite and necessary as well for the body as the soul, are the prayers we say heartfelt petitions or merely repetitions, with little thought or reflection on the things which we ask?

But do all prayers come true? Does God actually hear our prayers and does He never fail to answer them? That is what we need to know and there should be no uncertainty in our minds about it.

There is a superficial view of prayer which claims that to pray is of value only for its reflex influence on us, that it is a kind of comforting conversation with ourselves, a form of 'auto-suggestion' or 'wishful thinking.' A relevant comment on this shallow interpretation is in a remark once made by Artemus Ward: 'It ain't people's ignorance that does the harm, it's their knowing so much that ain't so.' For this view is merely a dogmatic assertion without intelligent understanding of the real nature of prayer. It amounts to a denial of any Spiritual Being in the universe higher than man, of God, who is Spirit, to be worshipped in spirit and in truth, and whom we can know where spirit with spirit meets. It is akin to the philosophy of the totalitarian state which asserts that there is no God above man, whose truth and moral laws all men and nations are to obey and in whose service there is perfect freedom. Under totalitarian rule, prayer to God who is to be obeyed rather than men is derided and suppressed; the decrees of a dictator are alone to be done. In the practice of prayer we can best clearly see the decisive dividing line between a society governed by the arbitrary will of a human dictator, and a society in which by obedience to God's laws men are led into truth and freedom.

That our prayers may come true the first necessity is to understand what it means really to pray. Prayer may be ineffective because it is not a regular practice of our lives but is thought of only in time of disaster or some critical emergency, when it is tried as a last resort. In such circumstances it is often said, 'There is nothing left to do but pray.' That is, after men have tried everything they know how to do and to no avail, they then think of prayer. But in normal times prayer may have had no place in their daily undertakings and may have been neglected for months.

So with nations: when a national policy has been governed by power-politics and materialistic greed and the inevitable crash ensues, prayers for national deliverance cannot be effective. But if men had prayed, and prayed aright, at the beginning of all they do, in readiness to live in fidelity to God's purpose and laws, how totally different would the world be to-day! We do rightly call on God in time of calamity and special need; from Him we do receive strength and wonderful aid. But prayer is essentially a preventive measure. It cannot save us from the results of our sins, though it helps us to overcome them. But it does more. It can keep us from committing them.

Another idea which we occasionally hear expressed is that we do not need to pray to God for what we can do ourselves. Those who hold it are like the little boy in the country who late one afternoon wandered off in the woods near his home. But soon he could not find his way back, and as night was coming on he felt 'there was nothing left to do but pray.' In running about he came to a knoll where he could see the lights in the village below. Then he stopped praying and said, 'Never mind, God, I can see Aunt Jennie's house now.'

In all our highest achievements we are constantly dependent upon resources and laws which we did not make but which we are to discover and beneficially to use. And to pray, far from being the desire to have God do for us a work which we ought to do, is precisely the reverse. In real prayer a first recognition is that God has given us talents and abundant means which we are to employ in responsibility to Him and for the largest human benefit.

To understand and to practice true prayer we turn to Christ. In prayer was the strength of His life. He frequently bade His disciples, 'come ye apart,' that they might be prepared to carry on His work in the world. And to learn from Him we ask, as did His first followers, 'Lord, teach us to pray' (*Luke* xi, 1).

As taught by Jesus, the primary characteristic of genuine prayer is the sincere desire to do the will of God. This is the fore-

st, pivotal petition in the answer He gave: 'After this manner refore pray ye:

> Our Father who art in heaven,
> Hallowed be thy name.
> Thy kingdom come,
> Thy will be done,
> On earth as it is in heaven' (*Matt.* vi, 9-10).

Herein is the horizon-wide difference between true religion and gic. Magic, whether in its primitive form or in any modern ivalent, is trying to get God, or the gods—however the Higher wer is conceived—to do our will, to give us the things we cify, to make God our 'tame confederate.' But real religion is ask in prayer to have our defective knowledge and limited ughts corrected and expanded by His larger truth which sets ree. It is to ask that our faulty, often misdirected wills be lifted and brought into accord with His perfect will and eternal pur-e. Prayer is never the wish to have the laws of the universe and ife suspended in order to grant our requests. It is rather to ask d to strive to have our lives and actions brought into more com-te conformity with them.

We do properly take up to God in prayer our deepest needs, highest desires, because His wisdom is greater than ours. We st therefore look for the larger answer.

> 'We, ignorant of ourselves,
> Beg often our own harms, which the wise powers
> Deny us for our good; so find we profit
> By losing of our prayers.'
> (*Anthony and Cleopatra,* Act II, Scene 2.)

Nor is prayer ever to be made on the assumption that if re-ted long enough we can finally persuade God to give us what ask. That is a pagan belief which Jesus explicitly repudiated: hey think that they shall be heard for their much speaking. Be ye therefore like unto them; for your Father knoweth what ngs ye have need of before ye ask him' (*Matt.* vi, 7-8). If man parents with their limitations give good gifts to their child-', 'how much more shall your Father who is in heaven give od things to those who ask him?' (*Matt.* vii, 11).

Not only does genuine prayer enlighten the mind and guide will; above all, it brings us into a personal relationship with d. This is why prayer is so indispensable for us to-day. We d greater wisdom to solve the huge and intricate issues of our e, rightly to plan for a world organization which will ensure to nations security, justice, freedom, and enduring peace. No less perative is the need for greater spiritual and moral energy to min this end. Merely to extol the ideal of one world of co-

operative fellowship and peace but without attention to how we are to get the necessary spiritual strength to make it a reality, is like erecting the poles and wires for conveying the electric current but neglecting to connect the structure with a power-house.

The achieving, realizing power for creating a new and finer world is in the dynamic of prayer. For in prayer our lives are opened to God who is the Fountain-Head and Supreme Source of all spiritual renewal and strength. 'They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint' (*Isaiah* xl, 31).

Into our hands has been committed by the discoveries and inventions of science an enormous physical power. What will be done with it is, as Julian Huxley has said, 'the most vital and alarming problem of modern times.' As a climax, there is the stupendous, awesome power released from the atom with its frightful possibilities if used for destruction.

But there is in the universe a still mightier power — the spiritual power which comes from God. It is mightier because this spiritual power which we may have through relating our lives to God in prayer can alone control the physical and direct it, not for destruction, but solely for human welfare, on-going civilization, a new world-order of righteousness and peace according to God's purpose for us.

If 'to work is to pray,' it is still more true that 'to pray is to work.' A man's prayers, it has been said, 'tell us not only what a man really is morally and spiritually, but what he desires to become' (*Basic Christianity*, by H. D. A. Major, p. 37).

The prayer for us all to pray is that we may become 'sons of the Kingdom' (*Matt.* xiii, 38); and the Kingdom is 'Thy will be done'—the reign of the spirit and purpose of God as incarnated in Christ, in the hearts and lives of men and expressed and made dominant in all human affairs, activities and institutions. As men thus pray, gaining greater wisdom and strength from God, so shall a new and peaceful world be not an unrealized hope or a fading vision, but established on an enduring foundation, and the kingdoms of this world shall become the Kingdom of Christ.

MEMORIALS TO MEDIAEVAL MASTER MASONS

By Canon Earle, author of *Essays on Mediaeval Subjects*

THE fabric rolls at York Minster, some of which have been printed by the Surtees Society, the research of the late Canon raine, contain numerous names of those who worked as masons, rpenters, sculptors, carvers, metal workers, plumbers, glass tists, painters of ceilings, altars, shrines and images, bell unders, locksmiths, illuminators, book makers and binders, the any arts and crafts of mediaeval times. Recorded, too, are the uarries from which stone was conveyed, and woods from which k timber was hewn; recorded also are the conditions of employ-ent and the rates of payment.

At York the master masons, *cementarii* or *lathomi*, who must rely have been the mediaeval designers also, were

Thomas de Pakenham William de Hoton
1351 William de Hoton Junr.
1368-71 Robert de Patrington
1399-1401 Hugh de Hedon
1415 William of Colchester
1421 John Long
1433 Thomas Pak.
1442-3 John Bowde
1445-7 John Barton
1451 John Porter
1466 Robert Spyllesby
1472 William Hyndeley or Hyndle
1505 Chr Horner
1526 John Forman.

nder these, all other masons and labourers worked. There were nster carpenters too: Philip de Lincoln 1350, Robert Downam 99, John Askam 1415, William Cottingham 1442-57.

But not a single stone remains to the memory of any mediaeval rkman within the Minster, though indeed it would be possible place upon various portions of the building a list of the work-n, derived from the fabric rolls, who actually produced the rk. Perhaps some day not only at York but elsewhere the names the master masons and master carpenters may be inscribed on some beautiful example of modern craftsmanship and so be eserved in public and honourable remembrance. Such a list, ginally ancient but later renewed, was formerly to be seen at niens Cathedral. The names of the general body of mediaeval

craftsmen, interesting to each particular building, would become far too numerous, except upon some roll of honour, or in a book of remembrance. The Wills of some few of these mediaeval craftsmen are known: they commonly do not forget the church where they worked or the apprentice in their employ.

It is not, however, of mediaeval craftsmen in a general sense that I write, but more especially of those rare instances where the burial place of a master mason is still known, and some memorial records his bodily presence within the building that his skill had raised.

There is at Croyland Abbey near Peterborough on an incised stone slab the effigy of William of Wermington, a fascinating likeness of a master mason of the early fifteenth century, holding in his hands the compass and set-square to denote his craft. The figure is habited in what are usually regarded as the cloak and cowl of a monk, but appear to me rather the lay cap and short-sleeved gown of the mason, and reclines below a floriated and crocketed canopy. There is an inscription round the slab which reads in Norman French:

† *ici : gist : mestre : Willm̄ : de Wermington : le : mason : a : lalame : De Ky Devvy p : sa : grace : Dovnez : Absolution :*

'Here lies master William of Wermington the mason on the soul of whom God of His Grace give absolution.'

The word 'master' had a real significance, conveying the sense of mastership in his craft. William of Wermington was the master mason, acting also as his own architect, at the time when Croyland was at the height of its fame, during the Abbacies of Thomas de Overton (1393), Richard de Upton (1417) and John de Lytlyngton (1427), and during this period were built the western cloisters, north and south transepts, the reredos of the altar of St. Guthlac, the Lady Chapel and refectory; the western part of the nave was rebuilt, and the western tower to accommodate the bells since the central tower had become insecure. Here he lies, surveying what remains of all his works. A monument which surely must be without parallel in England.

. . . . . .

There is a slab in the floor of the south walk of the cloister at Lincoln Minster, which is a restoration of an original slab of which fragments remain on the wall near by. This also commemorates a master mason, and probably the author of the famous Angel Choir, Richard of Gainsborough. The inscription reads:

'Hic jacet Ricardus de Gaynisburgh olim cementarius istius ecclesiae qui obiit duodecim Kalendarum Junii Anno Domini MCCC.'

'Here lies Richard of Gainsborough formerly master mason of this church who died the 20th of May in the year of the Lord 1300.'

ne date seems incomplete, because in 1306 a contract was made r the *novum opus* (the new work) between the Dean and Chapter d Richard of Gainsborough, 'the plain work to be done by easure and the carved work and sculpture by the day.' The ngel Choir was begun in 1280 but not completed until the early ars of the fourteenth century, as various letters of indulgence d appeals made by Bishops of Lincoln show.

Traces of mediaeval craftsmen upon their work (apart from sons' marks) are extremely rare. At York there is the figure of hind' on the screen considered to be a rebus on the name of e master mason, William Hyndeley (1472). At Lincoln there e three names known, painted upon the ceiling of the nave (and painted in the recent restoration), 'Fricabon,' 'Braund' and V. E. Paris.'

In the *Magna Vita* (the Complete Life) of St. Hugh, the saint described in his last illness as directing Geoffrey de Noiers, the abricae constructor' (either mason or carpenter), to hasten on the rk of completing the altar of St. John the Baptist, the patron nt of St. Hugh's Order, the Carthusian.

At Durham, on a buttress, there is the name 'Thomas Moises' rved.

. . . . . .

It is a long step from Lincoln Minster to Melrose Abbey in xburgh over the Border, but it is there that the third example a memorial to a master mason may be seen. Indeed there are o tablets let into the west wall of the south transept. One by dition is supposed to commemorate the grandfather, the other e grandson, both of the name Morow or Murray, in French oreau. Both are now much weathered and difficult to read. The st says:

> '*John Morow sum tym callit was I and born in parysse* (Paris) *certainly and had in kepying al mason werk of Santandroys* (St. Andrews) *ye hye kyrk of Glasgw Melros and Paslay* (Paisley) *of Nyddysdayll and of Galway I pray to God and Mari bath* (both) *and sweet S. John kep this haly kyrk fra skaith* (harm).'
>
> 'John Murray was I called in life, born for certain in Paris. I had under my charge all the mason's work of Saint Andrew's the High Kirk of Glascow, Melrose and Paisley of Niddersdale and of Galway. I pray both to God and Mary and sweet St. John to keep this holy Kirk from harm.'

The chapel opposite is supposed to have been dedicated to St. hn, with a statue of him of which a part only of the pedestal now nains. The other tablet refers by tradition to the grandson, der whom the rebuilding of the finest and most ornate part of e Abbey (the east and south walls) was accomplished. The tablet

takes the form of a shield above the door leading to the circumvallar gallery at the triforium level. On this shield are displayed two compasses crossed diagonally, with *fleur de lis* placed sides, top and bottom in the four vacant spaces. Down one side and down the other side of the shield, along the lintel of the door and terminating down part of the jamb of the door and out on to the wall a little way, is an inscription, now party defaced, which originally read :

> *' Sa ye cumpas gays evyn aboute sua trouth and laute sall, be halde to ye hende q' Johne Morve'*

which may be rendered :

> ' As the compass goes evenly about so truth and loyalty shall. Behold to the end, quoth John Morwe.'

Laute is the Scottish form of the French *Loyante*. There is a book, long out of print, *A Scots Medieval Architect*, by MacGregor Chalmers, where these inscriptions are very fully discussed.

The refreshing piety of these inscriptions reminds me of a line in Norman French, to be found with some little searching — the same line, ' *Dieu Temple y aide et garde du royne'*—upon the outside of two East Riding churches, the one Nafferton, where the inscription is about five feet from the ground on the south side of the tower, and the other Harpham, a church some three miles distant, where the same inscription, though weathered, is upon the lintel over the south door of the chancel. This stone has now vanished (1947). Whether these words mean ' May God help His temple and keep the Kingdom,' or whether the meaning is ' May the God of the temple help it and guard it from decay,' being the equivalent of modern French, ' *Que le Dieu du temple lui aide et garde de la rouille'* (rust), I must leave others to say, since so far as I know the words have not been noticed.

One likes to imagine the pious sentiment of some mediaeval craftsman prompting him to engrave these words, when his work of long ago was finished. As it were his last act before packing up his tools.

. . . . . .

It may be that other memorials remain, besides those at Croyland, Lincoln and Melrose, to show where mediaeval craftsmen lie amongst their works, which this article may serve to bring to modern notice and remembrance.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE REVISED CANONS

By H. A. T. Trehearne, LL.B., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law.

THE Archbishop of York and his fellow Commissioners have produced a Report which is both interesting and instructive. The Report is followed by a set of proposed new Canons, which, as the Archbishop rightly says in his foreword, will call for careful examination before they are accepted, and 'a few of which are certain to call forth discussion and criticism.'

We may pass over the history of the Canon Law prior to the Reformation, interesting though it is, and come at once to the *Act for the Submission of the Clergy* (25 Hen. VIII, c. 19). The best authorities seem to agree that this Act continued in force such part of the Canon Law as is 'not repugnant to the laws, statutes and customs of this realm, nor to the damage or hurt of the King's prerogative royal'; though, as Sir William Anson carefully explains, this continuation was provisional. It is important to note that the Act forbidding Papal Dispensations and the payment of Peter's Pence (25 Hen. VIII, c. 21) recites that the ground of the retention of all foreign law in this realm is long usage by the free consent of the people, and not the authority of 'any foreign prince, potentate or prelate.' Very large parts of the Canon Law which survived under the *Act for the Submission of the Clergy* have since been abolished by statute, or according to a theory of the Commissioners have become obsolete. (p. 64.) Again, as Sir Thomas Ridley, Archbishop Abbot's vicar-general, wrote: 'Some titles are out of use by reason of the gross idolatry they did contain in them . . . as the title of the Mass . . . and so instead of the Mass hath come in the Holy Communion.' (p. 47.) And as regards the residue the Commissioners frankly admit that it is 'indeterminate and indiscoverable' (p. 83), so that the question of its survival is perhaps not so important as might at first sight appear to be the case.

As regards the law-creative efficacy of custom we read (p. 64):

> 'The rule of ordinary English law that a custom to be enforceable must be shown or be presumed to have been in existence in the year 1189 is not a rule of Canon Law. By Canon Law, so far as length of time is concerned, the test is: "Can it be shown by clear evidence that the custom has been followed for an uninterrupted period of at least forty years?" The comparative shortness of this period makes it possible for post-Reformation customs to be treated as enforceable, and just as new

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> customs can in this way acquire the force of law, so can old customs previously enforceable lose their validity by a contrary custom of at least forty years' duration.'

It should be pointed out that this theory of forty years as the period of prescription, which is derived from Suarez, a foreign writer on Canon Law, was by no means generally received. There were, in fact, several different periods of prescription known to Roman Law, and there was no unanimity among the Canonists in the selection of any one of them as a test of the validity of custom. Many writers recognized time immemorial as the necessary period. *Illa consuetudo praejudicat juri, quae excedit hominum memoriam.* (*Decretals*, I, 4, 11). Accordingly forty years' usage should not be accepted as sufficient to clothe custom with the force of law. The importance of this point will be seen, for example, in considering the proposed new Canon XVII.

The Commissioners' views as to the relation of Canon Law to Statute cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged.

> 'If the statute merely re-enacts the old law the effect is to give added temporal authority and sanction to the Canon Law.' (p. 65.) 'It is otherwise where the Canon Law is substantially modified or even negatived by a statute. The immediate effect of such legislation is to create two different laws on the same subject — the canon and the statute. If the statute is accepted and acted upon by "Ecclesiastical authorities" (this important term is not defined) a contrary custom is established which overthrows the old Canon Law and substitutes the Statute in its place . . . But this result is not brought about by the statutes, *proprio vigore*, but by their acceptance by the Church and consequent establishment as custom. But where the statutes are not accepted, the Canon Law remains and the Churchman is subject to two laws.' (p. 66.)

These statements are, it is submitted, the reverse of the truth. The basis of the recognition of Canon Law in England, as we are told more than once in the Report (*e.g.* pp. 47, 63), and as the Act 25 Hen. VIII c. 21 testifies, is long continued usage or custom, and it is an elementary principle of English Law that no custom is of any validity against a statute. Apart from this the *Act for the Submission of the Clergy*, as already mentioned, continued in force only such part of the Canon Law as is 'not repugnant to the laws, statutes, and customs of this realm.' And indeed 'when applying the law derived from the papal codes which still remained in force the ecclesiastical judges had now to take account of any parliamentary statutes which had altered or modified that law in any particular direction.' (p. 50.) Could anything be more absurd than the proposition that the 'ecclesiastical authorities,' whoever they may be, are free to pick and choose between statutes which they will accept and those which they will refuse to obey?

Customary law, and therefore Canon Law, must yield not only to statute but also to precedent. The Common Law doctrine of binding precedents was not recognized by the Canonists (p. 35), but it did gain recognition, so we are told, in the nineteenth century. (p. 57.) For these reasons and also because a custom, in order to be valid, must be founded on immemorial usage, any custom to wear 'the foolish vestments'—as Archbishop Tait described them—is of no legal force or effect whatsoever. These vestments have been declared to be illegal by the highest Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical causes.

It may be of interest to examine in detail a few of the proposed new Canons.

1. Canon CXII, which proposes to abolish the jurisdiction of the King in Council as a final Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical causes, is certain to meet with determined opposition. It is inferred (p. 95) that this Court does not 'command the respect of Church people,' but it would be truer to say that it does not command the respect of the disloyal elements in the Church. The real reason for the proposal is, of course, that its decisions have been unfavourable to Anglo-Catholic opinion and practice.

It should not be forgotten that this jurisdiction was conferred by Act of Parliament on the King in Council in consequence of the recommendations of a Royal Commission, which included Archbishop Howley and Bishops Blomfield, Van Mildert and Kaye; and that no complaint was raised by bishops or clergy of any invasion by Parliament on their proper domain.

The Canon also provides for the reconstitution of the Ecclesiastical Courts of inferior jurisdiction and it is boldly assumed that the reconstituted Courts will be 'recognized as spiritually authoritative.' But will they? Such evidence as is available points the other way. In Read *v.* Bishop of Lincoln, Archbishop Benson presided in his own Court, which would presumably be regarded as 'spiritually authoritative.' The result of that case was generally favourable to the Ritualists, but the Archbishop held *inter alia* (i) that the 'manual acts' during the prayer of consecration must be so performed as to be visible to the congregation, and (ii) that the sign of the Cross in the final benediction is illegal. This part of the judgment is flagrantly and constantly defied in many churches.

Nothing could be more surely calculated to render the proposed new Courts ineffective than the retention of the episcopal veto, which dates from the *Public Worship Regulation Act* 1874, an Act of which in all other respects it is 'hoped to procure the repeal.' (p. 95.) The Royal Commissioners in 1905 had no hesitation in attributing the complete defeat of discipline, in a con-

siderable degree, to the inaction of the bishops, especially in the diocese of London.

2. It has already been pointed out by another writer that one result of Canon XIII (*c*) would be to bring in the use of the ill-starred Deposited Book which was rejected by Parliament in 1927 and 1928. No doubt this result was intended, and if so that fact should have been plainly stated in the body of the Report.

3. Canon XVII, which deals with the Vesture of Ministers during the Time of Divine Service, authorizes 'the customary vestments' at the administration of the Holy Communion. These vestments are not defined, but presumably they would include those which were adjudged to be illegal in Hebbert *v.* Purchas. It appears to be assumed in the Report that their use is already sactioned by custom, but reasons have been given above for rejecting this view. If any further argument is necessary it is to be found in the wording of Canon XIII (*c*)(ii), *viz.* that their use is 'contrary to and indicative of a departure from the doctrine of the Church of England.'

On the other hand there is a perfectly good custom for the minister to wear, not only at the Holy Communion but also at the Occasional Offices, the hood of his degree, and its use is indeed enjoined by the 58th Canon of 1603. The revised Canon apparently deprives him of this right, and also of the right to wear a gown when preaching. No reason whatever is assigned for these arbitrary proposals.

As it has been in the past, so apparently it is to be in the future; the introduction of the 'customary vestments' will be 'at the discretion of the minister' without regard to the wishes of the congregation.

It may be noted here that the Communion Table is not referred to as an 'altar,' a word which was deliberately banished from the Prayer Book in 1552.

4. Canon XX might with very great advantage provide for the recitation of the Litany in parish churches, at least on Sundays, in accordance with the Prayer Book rubric. 'This most exquisite of English compositions' is seldom heard now at any service except the Home Service (at least in certain parts of Essex), its place being taken by modern prayers which are frequently of very inferior workmanship.

5. Canons XXXVIII and XLIII propose to deprive the incumbent of his discretionary power to marry a person who has been previously married to a spouse who is still living. Surely the relief conferred by the *Matrimonial Causes Act* 1937, which removes the obligation to officiate at such a marriage should be

sufficient. The present proposal inflicts quite unnecessary hardship on innocent people. But, we are told, 'Divorced persons are precluded by the Canon Law from marrying again.' No doubt, but then the Canon Law also forbade marriage with a deceased wife's sister. Not a word is said about such marriages, although they too have 'social implications' (p. 55); and this relationship has been removed from the Table of Prohibited Degrees. This then is presumably a case in which a statute which overrides the Canon Law 'has been accepted by the Church.' (p. 66.)

6. He would be a bold man who would assert that Canon LVIII (Of Examination for Holy Orders) is 'in keeping with modern needs' (p. xiv), or is an improvement on Canon 34 of 1603, which required that as a general rule candidates for ordination should be graduates. The general level of education has risen enormously since 1603, opportunities of proceeding to the university have been multiplied, and, for those who for any reason cannot take up residence at a university, the University of London offers a very wide variety of courses at fees within the reach of all. Yet the proposed new Canon does nothing whatever to raise the intellectual standard of the clergy, which is now inferior to that of the clergy of the Church of Ireland and very greatly inferior to that of ministers of the Established Church of Scotland. Within the last forty years or so the general level has fallen perceptibly, with the result that the clergy who for long occupied the proud position of being the best educated class in the country are now quite content to take their place behind the schoolmasters, doctors, lawyers and the professional classes generally. At ordinations the Archdeacon is often in a very invidious position, as he is required to certify the Bishop that the candidates whom he presents are 'apt and meet for their learning,' although he may know perfectly well that they are nothing of the kind. At a recent ordination at Oxford, of all places, not one of the candidates was a graduate. It was Bishop John Wordsworth, I believe, who once remarked that 'literate' and 'illiterate' mean very much the same thing.

Great efforts are now being made, and rightly made, to improve the stipends of the clergy, but similar efforts should also be made to improve, and greatly improve, the standard of education of candidates for the ministry. The proposed new Canon is retrograde in its tendency and quite out of 'keeping with modern needs.'

No doubt these observations will be regarded in certain quarters as 'curiously ineffective' (p. 36), but it is hoped that they are sufficient to show how carefully the proposed new Canons should be scrutinized and revised before they are accepted. It is

fortunate indeed that 'some at least—certainly those which change Statute Law—will require the assent of Parliament as well as of His Majesty.' (p. vi.)

I add by way of postscript the following extract from a letter which I received from Bishop Hensley Henson two or three weeks before his death:

> 'It seems to me that it is very unfortunate that the idea should still be authenticated that the medieval Canon Law has any continuing authority in England . . . Its treatment of Scripture is grotesque and generally it is totally unsuitable for modern use; but so long as it remains there will always be bigoted and irrational or ignorant individuals who will affect to believe that it represents the law of God as against the inferior law of the State and will hold themselves free, therefore, nay bound, in conscience to obey it rather than statutes and customs of the realm.'

BOOK REVIEWS

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND HUMAN PERSONALITY*

On reading Mr. G. N. W. Tyrrell's book on the *Personality of Man*, a recent Penguin publication, one is apt to echo Pilate's 'What is Truth?' Mr. Tyrrell's main idea seems to be that in addition to our conscious personality—the Ego sitting here in my chair, certain of my surroundings, knowing that if I prick myself with a pin I shall feel the pain—there exists a second outside subliminal or paranormal self, which is capable of receiving outer impressions regardless of time and space. And it is this regardlessness of time and space which gives rise to the stories of precognition and prophecy which this book contains.

It is with this subliminal consciousness that the Society for Psychical Research, of which our author was the President, has chiefly to do: to unravel the mysteries of prophecy, to attempt to explain dreams, warning voices, and automatic writing, which occur in their exploratory experiments. The obscurity of the subject, and the quasi-philosophical terminology used, make it difficult for the man of ordinary intelligence to grasp exactly the line of argument which is necessarily theoretical. In a book of 300 pages much has to be compressed, and one finds oneself seeking for more detail in testing the truth of these stories, and a legal mind is hampered by the constant use of 'Mr. X.' instead of the genuine name of the narrator. It is putting him in a position of a prosecutor against a blackmailer, a timidity wholly unnecessary in a scientific experiment. The excuse given for this use of initials is that to give the real name would violate confidences. Why not give the name and address of the witness as is done in a mundane court of law? This hiding behind a pseudonym only creates suspicion that there is something doubtful to hide.

Nevertheless it must be admitted that, taken as a whole, there is a formidable mass of evidence to support the theory that (1) there is survival after death, (2) that messages are conveyed to the living through sensitives or mediums, (3) that only a limited number of people are capable of receiving subliminal impressions, (4) that this may be done subconsciously, and very rarely consciously, and (5) that the nearer in time the events recorded the

* *The Personality of Man*, by G. N. W. Tyrrell. (Penguin Publications.)

more vivid and complete the impression received. It would be unreasonable to reject this mass of evidence as figments of the imagination; at the same time the language, couched in many cases in cloudy, indirect, imaginative, and sometimes misleading answers to questions, leaves room for legitimate doubt.

Be it remembered that these investigations are conducted by men of science, or persons of a scientific point of view, but I cannot help thinking that the scientific habit of mind is not suitable for elucidating a subject so vague and indefinite. A scientist is rarely cross-examined, and when he is, he often cuts up badly. The expert witness is not in good repute among lawyers. As a famous expert once said, 'There are liars, damned liars, and expert witnesses. I have been one myself.' But joking apart, the man of science is apt to believe implicitly what his helpers in the laboratory tell him. He is out to prove his theory to be true; he does not, like Browning, 'prize the doubt'; he wishes, quite legitimately, to sweep it away; he becomes positive in his outlook, and clings tenaciously to his theory. Such a habit of mind, when applied to occultism and when endeavouring to prove matters beyond concrete experience, should, I think, be treated with caution.

On the other hand there is the scientific habit of mind which rejects any evidence which seems to run counter to what has hitherto been regarded as the order of Nature. It is too often forgotten that nearly all great pioneers of science such as Galileo, Darwin, Einstein, and others, have had to break down the opposition of their contemporaries because the new theories appeared to be contrary to the received systems, and therefore impossible. There is a danger in accepting a new theory merely because it is new, seems plausible, and you would like it to be so: there is also a danger in voting a theory impossible because it is against everything you have been led to believe. The surest plan is to withhold judgment till the evidence in favour of the theory is sufficient to enable one to form a settled opinion.

Generally speaking there are three modes whereby messages are said to be received by the subliminal or paranormal consciousness. First, through a medium who is usually a person of low intellectual faculty, and who records messages from a 'control,' a being on the other side. These controls are usually labelled by fantastic names, and evade giving direct answers to questions, and are apt to adopt an allusive style such as that used by gipsies in telling fortunes. But in many cases they reveal an accurate knowledge far beyond the capacity of the medium, such as classical and historical fact. Although in many of these experiments with mediums rank fraud has been detected again and again, yet it is rash to dogmatize and to assert that all mediums are tainted with fraud, for there is enough evidence to support the theory that some of these messages are genuine, and that the paranormal consciousness of the medium does receive messages from the other world.

Then there is the prophetic dream. In many of these cases either a warning voice is heard, or a precognition is received in a dream of some coming disaster which it enabled the dreamer to avoid. Some of these are authenticated by initials or pseudonyms by Mr. Tyrrell, but one hears of far too many of these cases in the ordinary course of life to attribute them to mere chance. A classical instance is that of 'Mr. O'Connor' who on March 23rd booked his passage for New York on the *Titanic*. She sailed on April the 10th. Ten days before she sailed he dreamed two nights running that 'he saw her floating on the sea keel upwards, and her passengers swimming around.' He cancelled his passage, and the *Titanic* was wrecked on the 14th of April. Here the premonition repeated twice was so strong that he acted on it. Most of us have heard of many precognitive dreams such as the above, some of them

leading to practical results, others mere pictures of future scenes without any definite results. If the bulk of these stories be true, what are we to think? It may be that in dreams, when we lose physical consciousness, our paranormal sense is more accessible to outer impressions than in waking life, this accessibility varying in different persons. But who makes the impression? 'Ay, there's the rub.' The religious man with Bible narratives in his hand will immediately attribute them to Almighty God, and if the disbeliever in Divine interference quotes many a 'fond and trivial' precognition in dreams, the only answer is that God moves in a mysterious way, and we are not allowed to fathom His reasons. These things will ever remain a mystery whatever the Psychical Research Society does to elucidate them.

Then there is automatic writing in which the 'sensitive,' or the writer, gets into a state of 'mental dissociation' from outward physical impressions, and writes automatically, either directly, or through an instrument, words written apart from normal consciousness. The hand moves separately from the mind of the sensitive who does not know what is being written. Perhaps the most amazing performance of automatic writing comes from America, the land of wonders and of fancy religions. A certain Mrs. Curran, a denizen of the Middle West and of limited education, tried automatic writing at the instance of a friend. It was not a success, and she was bored. Suddenly, on the 8th of July, 1913, a personality calling herself 'Patience Worth' burst in with communications couched in Old English style. It was wrung from her that in 1647 she had lived on a Dorset farm, had crossed to America, and been killed by Indians. From then onwards there proceeded from the portentous brain of this communicator a torrent of words which shaped themselves into three novels, *A Sorry Tale* in the time of Christ, *Telka* of the Middle Ages, and *The Pot upon the Wheel* dealing with the nineteenth century. And all the time the faithful Mrs. Curran recorded historical facts and matters on which she was profoundly ignorant. She was said to be closely observed throughout by Dr. Price of the Boston Society for Psychical Research. The learned and talented person, bred on a Dorset farm in the seventeenth century, never seems to have revealed how or where she acquired so much knowledge. These communications were 'couched in an archaic and very distinctive pungent English style, utterly different from the colloquial American of the Middle West.' Each novel was said to contain a contemporary style of its own. If these facts be true, this literary and historical knowledge can hardly have emanated from the conduit pipe, Mrs. Curran, whose ignorance was well known.

An objector might well say that Defoe wrote wondrously accurate stories of maritime life never having been to sea himself, but he had ample opportunities for picking up details from sailors in the Port of London, and was not all his life isolated in the Middle West. The mystery is who and what was 'Patience Worth?' We are still left in the dark. Mr. Tyrrell was converted from a 'languid curiosity' to believing in the story, and Dr. F. C. S. Schiller goes no further than to say that 'the general impression on my mind is to deepen the conviction that orthodox philosophy and orthodox psychology are both very far from having plumbed the depths of the soul.' Shakespeare went no further. 'There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.' We want to know a great deal more about such things before we pronounce a positive opinion.

When we come to the case of 'Mrs. Willett' we are faced with problems yet more wonderful. She was one of a group at Cambridge who made experiments beginning in the year 1906 to which elaborate tests were applied by Lord Balfour (Gerald), Sir Oliver Lodge and others. She, like Mrs.

Curran, was a woman of ordinary intelligence with no knowledge of the classics or special acquaintance with history. Her messages were delivered by automatic writing and by word of mouth, and Mr. Tyrrell devotes pages to her communications. Again one thing is observable: when questioned the communicators say nothing as to their state of being save that 'no words could express them.' There are hints of 'stages,' but no more.

In one message through 'Mrs. Willett' from Dr. Verrall to his widow entitled *The Ear of Dionysius*, a long and complicated story was given with cryptic references to accoustics, whispering gallery, slaves and tyrants, a one-eared place, Syracuse, Ulysses, Polyphemus, Acis and Galatea, matters which seemed irrelevant, and very naturally puzzled the investigators. All this rigmarole apparently was found to refer to a book called *Greek Melic Poets* which Dr. Verrall had in his library, and used in his lectures to his students. No wish was expressed about the book, and the case is cited only to show the telepathic influence between the dead and the living. One could wish the messages were less tortuous, but the communicators express a difficulty in handing on what they know. Sitting after sitting were held with long messages through 'Mrs. Willett' from Myers, Gurney, Verrall, and Sidgwick, in which they become less cloudy, and each speaking according to his wont, tone of voice, etc., but still they tell us nothing really important.

Sir Oliver Lodge's views on the subject are familiar to those who have read *Raymond*: Lord Balfour in his lecture on these sittings, having suppressed 'the most cogent evidence on account of its privacy,' adds that but for this evidence he would be content to suspend judgment as to whether the phenomena were 'due to subliminal activity, or to a source entirely outside the personality of the medium.' Afterwards, however, he became convinced that the communicators were indeed those whom they purported to be. Such evidence, which might be too nebulous to satisfy a court of law, might be accepted to support the belief in the immortality of the soul, the continuance of personality, and, under conditions somewhat strange and rarely exercised, intercourse with those who have passed over. Such a belief is an unspeakable joy to religious folk to have their 'intimations of immortality' confirmed by some echo (shall I call it?) obtained by means however uncertain and dubious to the rational mind, from those whom they have loved on earth.

With the mass of evidence growing day by day we cannot take Lord Kelvin's dictum seriously that 'one half of hypnotism and clairvoyance is imposture, and the rest bad observation.' Many years ago I happened to describe to him Kennedy, the mesmerist at the Royal Aquarium, stiffening the body of a man supported only by head and heels with nothing beneath him, and then sitting on him. Lord Kelvin then said that it was physically impossible for a *normal* person to hold his body in that position, much less in a cataleptic state. It gave me some youthful satisfaction, without asking him to sit on my body, to prove to him that it could be done. In matters outside his sphere the opinion of a scientific man is no better and no worse than that of the average man, but he is apt to be more positive.

Thought-reading is treated as an adjunct to telepathy though little space is given to it. In many cases it only amounts to muscle-reading, and was very fashionable in the last century. Mr. Tyrrell mentions Irving Bishop as a thought-reader. He was more than that. He was the cleverest conjurer I have ever met, and he set himself to show how spiritualistic phenomena could be produced by trickery. I saw him once in a theatre at Sheffield, hands tied behind his back and to his chair, a ring in his mouth, a tie over his shoulders, and coins balanced on his toes. By much wriggling and the dislocation of his shoulder-blade he tied the ring into a knot in the tie under his chin in

full view of the audience to show how mediums did their tricks. His method of thought, or rather muscle-reading, was to be led blindfold to a hidden object by one who knew where the object was hidden. The only contact was the tips of his fingers on the palm of the leader who, quite involuntarily, gave him the direction. I have often done this trick, but I found the effort of concentration too great to make a practice of it.

It seems a pity that the effect of two wars has prevented much further investigation, but, taken as a history of the Society for Psychical Research, it is admirable and valuable in that Mr. Tyrrell has relied more on suggestiveness than dogmatism. Now how far have we come after examining all these strange proceedings? I do not think we can subscribe to Dr. Inge's brilliant, but too sweeping assertion that 'the moment we are asked to accept "scientific evidence" for spiritual truth, the alleged spiritual truth becomes neither spiritual nor true,' for evidence must be to a certain extent scientific to support truth, and at least we are given reason whereby we may interpret such evidence.

There is enough in the *Personality of Man* to forbid us from dismissing these matters as arising out of self-deception or fraud, and also to help us to arrive at the author's corollary that the world order as we know it is 'a highly specialized affair, and not universal.' It may be that human personality has two kinds of self, the one the normal self which apprehends facts of normal life, and the other the utterly indefinable paranormal or subliminal self which, as developed by sensitives, becomes capable of receiving impressions from another world in a manner beyond the present ken of man. The more we know about the paranormal side of personality, and the laws by which it is governed, the better. The trouble is that we are hampered by the normal laws which govern this planet and tinge our views at the outset. Some day we may discover the laws which govern these paranormal controls and widen our vision of human personality, both in this world and the next. 'With God all things are possible.'

GILBERT COLERIDGE.

ALBERT SCHWEITZER—THE MAN AND HIS MIND*

This is the first full-length biography of this remarkable man and the author gives in the first part of the book a detailed account of Schweitzer's early years, his four-fold proficiency in New Testament Studies, Philosophy, Music and Medicine (he was granted a Doctorate in each of these faculties), his renunciation of the great future open to him in Europe and his devotion to the work of Christian Medical Missionary and preacher at Lamberéné on the Ogowe River in French Equatorial Africa.

Schweitzer's decision to give up his delightful sphere was due to the growing conviction that he had not the moral and spiritual right to take as a matter of course his attractive environment, good health and academic prospects. There grew up within him an understanding of the saying of Our Lord that we must not treat our lives as being for ourselves alone. 'Slowly but unceasingly this conviction grew upon me until at last it hid the whole sky.'

Schweitzer first became known in this country as a Higher Critic of the Gospels through the publication of his work *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* in 1906, translated into English in 1910 with the title *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*. This book, in which Schweitzer surveys some sixty-seven post-Reformation attempts to write a Life of Jesus, concludes with his own ex-

* *Albert Schweitzer: The Man and his Mind*, by George Seaver. (A. & C. Black, London. Sept. 30th, 1947. 18/-.)

pansion of the eschatological theory which he had taken over from Johannes Weiss.

Schweitzer's theory is summed up in his oft-quoted words:—

> ' . . . There is silence all around. The Baptist appears and cries: "Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand!" Soon after that comes Jesus, and in the knowledge that He is the coming Son of Man lays hold of the wheel of the world to set it moving on that last revolution which is to bring all ordinary history to a close. It refuses to turn and He throws Himself upon it. Then it does turn; and crushes Him. Instead of bringing in the eschatological conditions, He has destroyed them. The wheel rolls onward, and the mangled body of the one immeasurably great Man, who was strong enough to think of Himself as the spiritual ruler of mankind and to bend history to His purpose, is hanging upon it still. That is His victory and His reign.' (p. 194).

Schweitzer's work caused an immediate sensation in this country and received powerful backing, at the time, from Professors Sanday and Burkitt. More searching eschatological scholarship—as exemplified by Drs. R. H. Charles and B. H. Streeter—refused to be rattled and Dr. Glasson's latest volume on Christian Apocalypticism definitely supports Charles and Streeter in their refusal to accept Schweitzer's apocalyptic-eschatology.

What does this strange Jesus, for Schweitzer the victim of a great delusion and a mistaken world-view mean to Schweitzer?

Schweitzer's Christianity has nothing in common with traditional dogmatic belief. He holds that Jesus comes to us as the action of Will upon will. The abiding and the eternal in Jesus can only be apprehended by contact with His Spirit. We cite some of the most striking of his affirmations on this issue.

> 'In proportion as we have the Spirit of Jesus we have true knowledge of Him.'
>
> 'In Jesus Christ God is manifested as Will of Love. In union with Christ, union with God is realized in the only form attainable by us.'

Schweitzer records as a matter for thanksgiving that questions of dogma form practically no part in the teaching of the missionaries in Africa. To the natives Schweitzer speaks of Jesus as 'King of our hearts.'

> 'I always lead on to the innermost fact involved in becoming a Christian, namely the being lead captive by Christ so that even the native who is only present at one service can get an inkling of what it really is to be a Christian.'

It is Schweitzer's second work on the Pauline Theology *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle* which, however, contains the deepest expression of his Christian faith. The key which unlocks the mysteries of the Apostle's thought is for him the mysticism of 'dying-and-rising-with-Christ' whereby the believer is freed from sin and from the Law, possesses the Spirit of Christ and is assured of resurrection.

> 'By simply designating Jesus as "Our Lord" Paul raises Him above all the temporally conditioned conceptions in which the mystery of His Personality might be grasped and sets Him forth as a Spiritual being who transcends all human definitions to whom we have to surrender ourselves in order to experience in Him the true law of our existence and being.' (p. 228).

Schweitzer is no friend of a complacent, self-satisfied, world-embracing Christian liberalism—if such a liberalism can be called Christian at all—and

he writes that the chief sin which lies at its door is its failure to recognize that the essence of the teaching of Jesus is 'world-affirmation which has gone through the experience of world-negation' and issues in world-consecration.

We have not space here to deal with Schweitzer's Philosophy which he describes as *Reverence for Life*. This *Reverence for Life* is not as undiscriminating as it is in Buddhism, where all life is reverenced.

Schweitzer, the most practical of men, has no reverence for life which is hostile to life. He does not hesitate to shoot vultures or to destroy weeds but he would not willingly take any life if it were not necessary to sacrifice the lower in the interests of higher and better life—whether animal or vegetable.

Schweitzer is convinced that it is only by 'living' life that we can learn to live it aright. He is too much of an agnostic with his convictions of the limitations of human knowledge to be a dogmatic metaphysician. He is a rationalist in that he will not accept anything that is contrary to reason, but he is also a Mystic possessed of the conviction that mystical experience which is both ethical and spiritual can teach us much which pure reason cannot unveil.

We would add one further point of definition. Schweitzer's mysticism is essentially Christian. It realizes itself in active, heroic, loving, self-denying service. It is to such a life as this that he believes Jesus has called him. In this connection we cannot resist citing the closing passage from *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* which has been cited so many times.

> 'He comes to us as One unknown, without a name, as of old by the lake-side. He came to those men who knew Him not. He speaks to us the same word: "Follow thou me!" and sets us to the tasks which He has to fulfil for our time. He commands. And to those who obey Him, whether they be wise or simple, He will reveal Himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings which they shall pass through in His fellowship, and as an ineffable mystery, they shall learn in their own experience Who He is.' (p. 195).

It is hardly necessary to emphasize that Schweitzer is no mere emotional idealist but an intensely understanding and practical promoter of civilization. This is testified to not only by what he has accomplished at Lamberéné but also by the quality of his exposition of sound methods of promoting civilization among savages. His paper *The Relations of the White to the Coloured Races* published in 1928, was received with understanding appreciation and profound respect by our Colonial Administrators.

Dr. Seaver presents with some fulness Schweitzer's work on the music of J. S. Bach. In this field Schweitzer is concerned to portray the Bach who is a poet and painter in sound in contrast to 'the Bach of the Guardians of the Grail of Pure Music.'

Dr. Seaver is indeed to be congratulated on *Albert Schweitzer—The Man and his Mind*. In his volume we see clearly portrayed not simply a great humanitarian but a great Christian. L.W.B.

THOUGHTS ON PRAYER*

The writings of Alexis Carrel have a considerable vogue, and what he says about prayer will probably reach a wider circle than the utterances of our official religious teachers. People will listen to a doctor when they will not listen to a clergyman. He defines prayer as 'a tension of the spirit to-

* *Prayer*, by Dr. Alexis Carrel. Translated by Dulcie de Ste Croix Wright. (Hodder & Stoughton. 3/6.)

wards the immaterial substratum of the world.' He declares that 'true prayer represents a mystic state when the consciousness is absorbed in God.' But surely this is an exceptional type of prayer? 'This state,' he remarks, 'is not of an intellectual nature.' Perhaps not; but to be regarded as valid, it must be able to stand up to the scrutiny of the intellect. It was a wise warning of the late Professor Whitehead, who wrote:

> 'Religious truth must be developed from knowledge acquired when our ordinary senses and intellectual operations are at their highest pitch of discipline. To move one step from this position towards the dark recesses of abnormal psychology is to surrender finally any hope of a solid foundation for religious doctrine.'

Dr. Carrel is probably right when he speaks of the rarity of prayer, and remarks that 'the sense of the holy is on the way to disappearance among civilized people.' Is this because science has banished mystery from Nature, or because Westerners are all extraverts? Yet 'when prayer is habitual and really fervent, its influence becomes very clear.' There results 'a kind of mental and organic transformation,' and 'a doctor who sees a patient give himself to prayer, can indeed rejoice,' since 'the calm engendered by prayer is a powerful aid to healing.' Dr. Carrel states that it is known for certain that prayer does produce tangible curative effects. 'Patients have been cured almost instantaneously of affections such as lupus of the face, cancer, kidney troubles, ulcers, tuberculosis of the lungs, of the bones or peritoneum.' With regard to Lourdes, he remarks that miracles are much less frequent there than they were forty or fifty years ago, and attributes this to the fact that the sick no longer find there the atmosphere of profound contemplation which formerly reigned. 'The pilgrims have become tourists and their prayers inefficacious.' One may imagine that decline of this sort may easily take place, for it is not in the physical sphere only that the law of entropy prevails.

Dr. Carrel is undoubtedly right when he says that a fundamental activity cannot be allowed to lapse without the incurring of grave loss. If a poet has died young in most of us, it is conceivable that the saint too has come to an untimely end. Too many people in our machine-driven societies are losing the sense of reverence and of wonder. Is it the case that when the sense of the holy goes, morals begin to go too? Is it possible, as Socrates desired, to construct a moral system independent of all religious sanctions? Doubtless it would be possible to devise one, but would its behests be obeyed? It would appear that in the absence of religious sanctions the State has to step in. The present growth in State power is the price we pay for the decline in religion. Exit the priest, and enter the Secret Police, and the Commissar. It is the old story of King Log and King Stork.

It seems a permissible hypothesis that as our bodies cannot be independent of their material environment, so our selves are dependent upon the spiritual *milieu* in which they have their being. It is possible to starve the soul as well as the body, and it is far more prevalent. *Si exemplum requiris, circumspice.*

Mrs. Wright has done us all a service by translating this small but not insignificant book. J.C.H.

A PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION*

Canon Spencer Leeson's Bampton Lectures delivered (now some three years ago) before the University at Oxford, were meant as a Tract for the

* *Christian Education*, being the Bampton Lectures for the year 1944, by the Rev. Canon Spencer Leeson, Rector of St. Mary's, Southampton; sometime Headmaster of Merchant Taylors' School and Winchester College. (Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd. 15/-.)

Times at the date of their delivery, but they are of more than passing signi ficance. They present a Christian philosophy of education based on scholar ship and research, and build up a foundation from which the problems of th present can be surveyed without loss of balance. On this basis the late lectures in this volume, warmed by the author's native idealism and tolerance of spirit, go on to frame a policy for the Church of England which shall help through the schools to bring the nation back to the Christianity upon which it has lost its grip. Canon Leeson feels that Christians have their chance to-day, if they are clear, positive, and constructive, and he ends his volume with a statement of the Christian Faith which is orthodox, conservative, and not afraid of dogma.

The lectures have a wide appeal, and should be widely read, especially by teachers and administrators: they contain both in the lectures and in the appendices which follow, much pregnant thought, and a great deal of in formation which can be claimed to be of current importance, and which is not gathered into any other work with equal clearness and attractiveness. Even for those who cannot accept the author's solutions the factual conten of the volume is very valuable and these facts are stated with a moderation and clarity which are a model for the conduct of discussion, and typical of the new spirit in the educational world when at its best. Unfortunately that spirit does not prevail by any means everywhere as yet; it is a merit of these lectures that they will help it to spread.

With these preliminary remarks in mind it would appear that a review can help most by indicating in more detail what the lectures actually say rather than by criticizing, or by seeking to controvert, selected opinions. Accordingly the first lecture lays down that any teacher who is worth his salt must know why he does what he is doing, and asserts that

> 'only by gazing with all the intensity of a man's spirit on the vision of God can the Christian attain that truth of discernment and judgmen that will lead and keep him right in thought and action.'

From this position the weakness of some popular statements of the purpose of education is exposed, in particular, that its end is the free expression and development of personality, and again that other limited but very popular belief that education should seek to produce good citizens. The argumen closes with an eloquent appeal to philosophy to concern itself once more with the spiritual needs of ordinary men.

The next lecture is ambitious, for it attempts in twenty-four pages to deal with the teaching of Plato, the problems which it raises, its merits and its limitations. Though the author regards Plato as a burning and a shining light, he nevertheless criticizes him for caring more for the chosen few than the ungifted many, for conceding too much authority and influence to the State, for presenting God as an abstraction, for being in a word a Greek prophet and not a Hebrew one. Brief as this chapter is, and much as one misses any reference to the Cambridge Platonists, it is valuable, and may lead many teachers who have not read Greats at Oxford to find in Plato a living water of the spirit which our age so badly needs.

The third and the fourth lectures go together. The former rapidly recapi tulates the work of the Church in English education, but devotes most of it space to the years which have followed the Industrial Revolution. It carries the story of educational development in this country down to the Educatio Act of 1944. The latter, which many unregenerate lay teachers will find th most interesting of the series, discusses the climate of opinion, that whol welter of ideas that has gone to the making of the modern mind. Again th criticism suggests itself that too much is attempted in the space that can b

allowed, and it is good news that Canon Leeson contemplates a further work on this topic. It may perhaps be said that the survey, as it stands, is not quite up to date, and it is certainly inadequate in its treatment of modernism. But it is an honest attempt to see the position as it actually is to-day, and to discover the reasons for the loss of central purpose in our schools, and indeed in our national life.

The second series of four lectures is straightforward, and must have been rather easier going for the author. It may be enough to state their subjects. Lecture V deals with the Christian interpretation of human life. The theology is conservative and orthodox; the argument is clearly stated. Lecture VI is factual, and sets out a picture of Christianity and the place which it holds in English education to-day. Lecture VII deals with the fourfold partnership of the home, the school, the State, and the Church, and in Lecture VIII the book comes down to the entirely practical issue of framing a programme for the Church of England by which it can make its best contribution to that education of the future which shall bring this country back to Christ.

A word should be added to draw attention both to the value of the notes and appendices, and to their variety, which reflects Canon Leeson's long experience and his many interests. The notes deal with the value of comparative religion as a school subject, with the Law of Nature, with the Archbishop's Five Points, and with the alternative methods which have been suggested for dealing with the Dual System: the appendices treat the Education Act of 1944, the agreed syllabuses, the movement of opinion, as reflected in the official publications of the last quarter of a century, and ends greatly daring with a statement of the Christian faith.

Though there will certainly be some who will feel that the Christianity here preached is one that overcomes difficulties by ignoring them, and others will say that critics and opponents are sometimes unfairly represented and not understood, something of this is due to the plain fact that the writer had frequently to compress into a lecture matter for which he required a volume. There is so much that is good in this work that there is great hope that Canon Leeson, under less limiting conditions, and with more leisure, if such a state of things is conceivable, will write a great book. There are, at any rate, few who have given thought to these deep issues who will disagree with what the author writes in his last lecture:—

> 'There will never be Christian education in England, till the nation has been told what the faith is in the language of to-day and in relation to their real spiritual needs . . . till our countrymen recognize that those who teach it have themselves absorbed the new knowledge . . . and have taken account of it in framing their own interpretation of the universe and man's place and duty in it.'

C. Norwood.

'THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND NON-EPISCOPAL CHURCHES IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES'*

'Facts are sacred; comment is free.' This famous dictum of Scott of the *Manchester Guardian* is a guide as much for historical and theological writing as it is for journalism. In much recent writing on the church and the ministry there has been more respect for the freedom of comment than for the sacred-

* *An Essay towards an Historical Interpretation of the Anglican Tradition from Whitgift to Wake,* by Norman Sykes, Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. ('Theology' Occasional Papers, New Series, No. 11. 1948. 1/6.)

ness of facts. Thus for instance Bishop Stephen Neill commenting on the book *The Apostolic Ministry,* edited by the Bishop of Oxford, writes: 'Throughout, the reader has the disturbing feeling that the conclusions were reached before the evidence was considered, that a certain structure of thought has been imposed on the facts rather than deduced from them, and that presuppositions which he may not be prepared to grant lurk all the time in the background, without ever being brought out into the daylight and dispassionately discussed.' Professor Norman Sykes's pamphlet *The Church of England and Non-Episcopal churches in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* conveys to the reader the opposite impression. It leaves the reader in no doubt that the author's first care is to present the facts in a scholarly and dispassionate manner. Facts for him are sacred. Since the publication of this essay the author has himself given the widest publicity to two corrections which have been brought to his notice. The citation on page 5 ascribed to Whitgift should be ascribed to his Puritan opponents. On page 44 in the citation from *Darwell Stone,* by Dr. F. L. Cross, 'providentially mistaken' should read 'providential.' In a concisely-written essay packed with apposite quotations from many authors, these two slips make no difference to the validity of the conclusions. The reader gets the impression that the conclusions are assured and irreproachable because they are fairly drawn from the *facts.* And the conclusions are summarized thus:

> 'Moreover it is in this combination of a positive affirmation of the value of episcopacy and of a refusal to assert for it an exclusive claim that the *differentia* of the Anglican tradition consists. In this as in other respects the Anglican tradition is that of a *via media.* In defence of its own history and position the Church of England stands firmly by its retention of episcopacy; in looking forward to the possibility of ecclesiastical reunion, it affirms that such union must find its indispensable basis in the episcopal form of church polity; and at the same time it refuses to unchurch non-episcopal churches and preserves an historical tradition of communion with them' (p. 44).

Professor Sykes's notable essay shows that this conclusion is in accordance with the formularies of the Church of England, the writings of the Anglican divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the practice of the Church of England during that period.

The preface to the ordinal is unambiguous in its declaration of the intention of the Church of England to retain the traditional orders of Bishop, Priest and Deacon. But the absence of any statement concerning the doctrinal significance of episcopacy is noteworthy, and Article XIX *Of the Church* and Article XXIII *Of Ministering in the Congregation* were so drafted as not to unchurch the non-episcopal Churches. The Anglican Fathers of the Elizabethan Church defended episcopacy as a tolerable form of Church Government and not, as the Puritan advocates for a Presbyterian polity, a matter of divine prescription.

> 'It was one of the characteristic *differentiae* of the Anglican theological position, in an age when its opponents, alike presbyterian and papist, advanced exclusive claims for their particular form of ecclesiastical polity, to combine the defence of the primitive and apostolic nature of episcopacy with the allowance of other forms of church government. The Anglican attitude was to marshal the evidences, both Scriptural and patristic, for episcopacy without asserting exclusive validity for a episcopal ministry or unchurching non-episcopal churches. The weight and volume of Anglican defence of episcopacy should not be forgotten

in appreciating also the tolerant and comprehensive temper in which it was conceived' (p. 12).

Hooker supported by Whitgift made a clear distinction, as Professor Sykes points out, between things 'necessary' and things 'accessory' (the epithets are Hooker's); and reckoned ceremonies

> 'and matters of government in the number of things accessory, not things necessary.'

The representative Caroline divines, stout upholders of episcopacy, were generally prepared to excuse the lack of it among the continental reformed churches on the grounds of necessity but refused to unchurch them for this defect. This was the view adopted by Andrewes, Bramhall and Bishop Hall though it seemed less convincing to Jeremy Taylor. Even so stout an upholder of episcopacy as Thorndike desired the continuance of fraternal relations with the non-episcopal reformed churches. Summarizing his survey of the Caroline Divines Professor Sykes writes:

> 'Between the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Anglican divines there is indeed a difference of emphasis in their apologetic for episcopacy. With the Caroline divines the non-episcopal churches are thrown definitely on the defensive and their lack of episcopacy regarded as a defect, excusable on the ground of historical circumstances and necessity. But the respect with which Laud, Bramhall, Taylor and Thorndike speak of the Lutheran churches which had retained the episcopal form of government is noteworthy; and there is a general agreement to distinguish between the nature and essence of a church on the one hand and its integrity and perfection on the other, and thereby not to unchurch the presbyterian churches of the Reformed model.'

The practice of the Anglican Divines in their relationship with foreign churches was consistent with their theological position. Some non-episcopal ministers officiated in English churches. 'The Communion which hath always been used between this church and the reformed churches' (to quote Thorndike's description) 'found its chief expression in the reception to Holy Communion in Anglican churches of visiting members of the continental churches, Lutheran and Reformed, during their residence in this country, of which custom the evidence is clear and copious.' Similarly Anglicans in exile like Cosin and Wake attended the reformed churches 'I never refused' wrote Cosin, 'to join with the Protestants either here (Paris) or anywhere else in all things wherein they join with the Church of England.' Some Anglicans like Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury and the future non-juror George Hickes received communion with the Reformed Church though there was difference both of opinion and custom amongst Anglicans with regard to their reception of the sacrament in foreign churches.

The relations of the Church of England with the non-episcopal churches at home was a different story. Here no plea of necessity could be acknowledged though after the failure of the attempt at comprehension there is no doubt that the practice of occasional conformity had its roots in purely religious considerations and in the words of Edmund Calamy,

> 'had been used by some of the most eminent of our ministers ever since 1662, with a design to shew their charity towards that church, notwithstanding they apprehended themselves bound in conscience ordinarily to separate from it; and that it has long been also practised by a number of the most understanding people among them, before the doing so was necessary to qualify for a place.'

Professor Sykes's pamphlet is, in the words of its sub-title, 'an essay

towards an historical interpretation of the Anglican Tradition from Whitgift to Wake.' He does full justice to the learning and conviction of the Anglican apologetic for episcopacy. Equally clearly he demonstrates that side by side with this insistence on the value of episcopacy there was the refusal to unchurch those foreign churches which lacked it or to set forward an exclusive claim for this form of church polity.

Such a thesis is, of course, familiar enough and has been advanced in the present century by a number of writers including Hensley Henson and Dr. Hunkin. But this further contribution to the subject is timely and salutary, and should help to combat mistaken views which are still widespread. The exclusive claim for episcopacy dates from the Tractarians. Professor Sykes quotes from the view of Dr. Darwell Stone,

> 'There always seems to me to have been something providential in the notion of the Tractarians that they had support for their position in a post-Reformation tradition, because without this belief they very likely would not have had the heart to go on. But I think we have now to face the facts that, so far as the Reformation and post-Reformation formularies and divines are concerned, there are loopholes which we can use, but not the support for exclusive position.'

A theory constructed from 'loopholes' might seem very precarious. But the time comes when the unstable basis of the theory is ignored and the theory itself assumed uncritically to be sound and convincing. It is then an easy passage to the view prevalent in some circles to-day that the true position of the Church of England in the matter of the ministry and its relations with other reformed churches is that associated with the Tractarians and their Anglo-Catholic successors. Professor Sykes's pamphlet is a most effective counterblast to these erroneous opinions. It is an essay of outstanding value and importance and should influence those who are responsible to-day for regulating the relations of the Church of England with other reformed churches. Its slender size and modest price leave little excuse for its not being read.

W. G. Fallows.

CONVERSATION PIECE*

Philosophers from Plato to Bishop Berkeley have used the device of dialogue to recommend their views to their readers and to ease the labour of following a sustained argument. In Dr. Worsley's book a barrister, a University lecturer in the philosophy of religion, and a clergyman discuss, with the comfortable aid of sherry and cigars, the nature of God.

The University lecturer quotes with approval a sentence from Kirsopp Lake's *Paul: his Heritage and Legacy*:

> 'I do not believe in the existence of any creator, and when I use the word God, I mean the totality of values, not a person, or a "personal being" who created values, which are eternal and neither created nor derived.'
>
> 'The other layman considers this "first-rate".'

It would not be unfair to say that this is typical of the dialogue's procedure. Gamston, the barrister, feels all the 'plain man's' difficulties—the idea of 'Almighty God' being unable to stop wars, and so on; while Scrooby, the lecturer in the philosophy of religion, knows all the answers. As for the Vicar, the good Canon Merry, he, poor fellow, is either shocked or muddled all the time, and indeed says very little compared with the other two; he evidently finds it hard to get a word in.

* *Is there an Honest God?* By J. W. B. Worsley. (Macdonald. 10/6.)

The book would have been very much more stimulating if it had presented us with a real battle. Canon Merry, instead of being a gentlemanly 'yes man' who has to say No, should have been a really tough customer to give these two self-satisfied lawyers a run for their money. One may not hold a conservative theological position, but if one could not make out a better case for it than the feeble Canon, one would go out of business. The other contestants give him plenty of chances.

For example, that statement of Lake's is about as tenable philosophically as a brick building under artillery fire. For what are values apart from the mind which creates them? They are as dependent upon the mind as colour is upon the senses. And all values, unless they have their basis in a divine Mind which can support them and make them permanent, are 'as changing as the forms of clouds.'

Of course a work of this kind—if it is to be read by the general public—must preserve the light touch. But to combine this with the earnestness which the profound topic deserves, is no easy matter. None of the contestants here seem to go to the root of the matter; they do not really get to grips with things. It is too much like a Brains Trust. Canon Merry, of course, is not persuaded; but neither can he persuade. Dr. Worsley should have made him 'a watch-dog of the Lord' to bite the legs of these lawyers—these pseudo-intellectuals. That would have made it a really entertaining and edifying work. J.C.H.

CONSIDER THE HEAVENS*

It is an interesting speculation to inquire what would have been the probable result on human mentality had the atmosphere of the earth been so shrouded with vapour that its inhabitants would never have been able to see the stars. The conception of infinity could hardly have come into existence, and it may well be that religion would not have developed. At any rate the study of the stars has been associated with religion from very early times, and nothing can be more interesting than to examine the beliefs and practices of ancient civilizations towards the heavenly bodies and their movements. Dr. Davidson in the volume under review gives us interesting chapters on Chinese, Chaldean, Egyptian, Hindu, Greek and Hebrew astronomy, as well as on that of the Middle Ages, before coming to Copernicus and the modern period which he initiated.

In spite of much accurate work with inferior equipment, the Chinese do not seem to have advanced far in theoretical knowledge. The Chaldeans, too, were better at making observations than at formulating theories, and their observations of eclipses have been very useful in recent times for determining the amount of the retardation of the earth's rotation. The chief concern of the Egyptian priests with astronomy was to enable them to predict the coming of the summer solstice, when the Nile was wont to overflow and irrigate the country. It would seem that the Greeks were the first people to be interested not only in facts but in the reasons for them, and Dr. Davidson gives a very interesting account of the various theories of their philosophers. The work of Hipparchus, who carried out observations from 161 to 126 B.C., seems to have been the most remarkable of all.

Dr. Davidson traces the development of modern astronomy from Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Kepler, Galileo to Newton and beyond, though he does not deal with the subject of relativity, which he says is 'too abstruse to be dealt with fully in this book.' Yet the reader who is not in a position

* *The Stars and the Mind*, by Martin Davidson, D.Sc., F.R.A.S. (Watts & Co. 10/6.)

to consult specialized treatises, would have welcomed a succinct exposition of the theory, or the outlines of it.

In a chapter on 'The Impact of Astronomical Developments on the Christian Faith,' Dr. Davidson remarks that the earth has been dethroned from the centre of the universe, the sun from the centre of the Galaxy, and man from the summit of creation. As a matter of fact the earth is as much the centre as any other spot, and what signifies a central position anyhow? And biologically man, since he is the latest product of evolution, has a fair claim to be considered its crown. The point that Christ was 'ignorant of anything approaching our conception of the universe' and that this lack of knowledge led to his apocalytic expectations and thereby affected his ethical ideas, are certainly points of importance. Dr. Davidson himself does not suggest any way out of the difficulty. The present reviewer has never been able to share the usual horror of apocalyptic notions, which, if regarded symbolically, do illustrate the inescapable consequences of conduct in this life; and, what is more, they do insist that this world in itself and out of relation to eternity, is 'vanity.' Dr. Davidson agrees with Dr. Inge in recognizing the necessity 'for recasting all theological doctrines which rest on the geocentric theory of the universe.' We wish that he had indicated the lines on which such a recasting might be achieved. To the reviewer the geocentric theory, however quaint it seems, does not seem greatly to matter since the acceptance of relativity.

Dr. Davidson has some interesting remarks on what is known as the second law of thermodynamics—the law of the irreversibility of the flow of energy which thus tends in the end to be exhausted, or to exist only in a form when it can no longer be available. The usual consequence based on this theory is that the universe is 'running down,' and will in due course exhibit a dead level of complete inaction.

> 'Is it possible,' asks Dr. Davidson, 'that it (the law) has not a universal application? Is it true to say that, out in the depths of space, matter is being transformed into heat, and that some day the process will cease, when a dead level has been reached? Are we quite certain that the reverse process does not go on—the transformation of heat into matter? The probability against it may be enormous, looking at the problem from our very limited and restricted point of view.... Instead of postulating the winding up of the universe at some remote period, is there any *a priori* reason why there may not be an eternal rejuvenescence?'

We could wish that Dr. Davidson had gone more fully into the problem of molar and atomic physics and the contrast between them, since the behaviour of electrons and kindred bodies does appear to exhibit a certain indeterminacy. Dr. Davidson has indeed dealt with the matter elsewhere, but the problem is of such importance, and may affect so radically our view of things as a whole, that a *resumé* of his views, and the considerations which led him thereto, would have been welcome. He does indeed remark that,

> 'The old mechanical view of the universe—a view which regarded it as a closed system—has been disturbed in comparatively recent times by the progress of atomic physics, and a few physicists have adopted the view that we can no longer regard the universe as closed. The controversy on the problem still continues and probably will continue unless some new discovery throws more light on the subject or shows that the divergence of opinion may be due merely to different ways of looking at the problem.'

We note that Dr. Davidson holds that planetary systems may not be so extremely rare as was until recently supposed. Thus the solar system need not be regarded as unique nor the sole theatre of the drama of life. 'Myriads of such other systems may exist. With our enlarged conception of the immensity of the cosmos there has arisen also an enlarged conception of the universe of life. Not only is there a unity extending from the infinitely small to the infinitely great—from electrons to stars and galaxies—there is also a unity in the realm of life itself. Who can say what diverse forms it may assume on myriads of other worlds?'

No one can read this book without having his mind and imagination stimulated. J.C.H.

DIVERGENT ASPECTS OF AMERICAN THEOLOGY*

Kant declared that he had found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to leave room for faith: Prof. Wieman holds that the denial of faith affords more ample room for knowledge. Although he is Professor of Christian theology at Chicago University, *The Source of Human Good* soon makes clear that he has very little use for theology at all.

> 'We ignore,' says the writer, 'the transcendental affirmation in the Jewish Christian tradition of a creative God who not only works in history but resides beyond history. The only creative God we recognize is the creative event itself' (p. 7).

The purpose of the book is in fact to show that the 'creative event' is the source of human good, and when Prof. Wieman speaks of God, it is this creative event which he means. What that actually is, it is not altogether easy to see. We are told that it is:

> 'One that brings forth in the human mind, in society and history, and in the appreciable world a new structure of interrelatedness, whereby events are discriminated and related in a manner not possible before' (p. 65).

We are also told that it is made up of four sub-events or stages, the first of which is simply the 'interaction between the organism and its surroundings' (p. 58). The 'integration' which may result from this is the second stage, and arising out of this in turn is the third stage—'the expanding and enriching of the appreciable world' (p. 61). The 'final stage in human good' is the 'widening and deepening community between those who participate in the total creative event' (p. 64). It may be granted that these are essential factors in the development of human experience, but can it also be granted that any event, no matter how creative, is an adequate substitute for the living God? Prof. Wieman evidently thinks that it can be.

The chief reason for his abandonment of Christian belief is his extreme deference to 'science and technology.' These, he says,

> 'are to-day the shapers of history and must be either the great constructors or the great destroyers' (p. 31).

Because they are limited to purely empirical data, religion, in Prof. Wieman's view, if it is to succeed in making them constructive must be similarly limited.

* *The Source of Human Good,* by Henry N. Wieman. (Chicago Univ. Press (Great Britain, C.U.P.). 1946. 20/-.)

Apostolic Succession and Anglicanism (1946) and *Christ and Divorce* (1945), by Felix L. Circlot, Th.D. (Trafton Publishing Co., Lexington, U.S.A.)

He does not deny the possibility of metaphysical reality but he does deny its relevance to human affairs, and any other way of regarding it he holds to be thoroughly mischievous. His attention is directed towards the attainment of 'a region where men may live richly under the rule of a redirected devotion for a thousand years or more' (p. 52). Hence the professor is desperately anxious lest the misuse of atomic energy should prevent the realization of this.

But why should man's terrestrial fortunes be a matter of such grave concern when the idea of a transcendent purpose in life has been set aside? Prof. Wieman alleges that the raising of such a question is the 'pernicious consequence' of religion.

> 'Many,' he says, 'have lived and do now live courageously and constructively, without any injections from this belief. Hence the alleged meaninglessness of life without this belief is only a confession that one has become addicted to the drug and cannot live without it' (p. 89).

Such a charge is grossly unfair, for it merely begs the question, and although a direct assertion to the contrary would perhaps be to repay the professor in his own coin, yet at least there is far more evidence for the ennobling effects of a transcendent faith than can be adduced in support of his own position (*cf.* Russell Lowell). Of two things which he ignores we can at any rate be fairly sure. One is that his doctrine of the creative event can never make a popular appeal: it can never hope to compete against straightforward materialism or to allay its consequences. And secondly man's enquiring nature will not easily allow metaphysics to be set aside. It will continue to speculate upon the ultimate meaning of existence and the origin of values, refusing to be satisfied with the notion that any sort of event can have *created* them. So faith will demand to make its venture; it cannot be excluded after all.

But if *The Source of Human Good* presents us with a form of Christianity which can hardly be recognized as such, two other recent American books, written from a very different standpoint, will seem, to modern churchmen at least, hardly more satisfying.

Apostolic Succession and Anglicanism is an elaborate study of Anglican Orders and Eucharistic doctrine. Dr. Circlot is an Anglo-Catholic who believes that from no other position can the claims of the Roman Church be successfully opposed. Consequently he sets out to enquire:—

> '1. Can it be truthfully maintained that the Anglo-Catholic position is a correct account of the present and continuous *official* position of Anglicanism ever since the Reformation?
>
> '2. Can that position, granted it to be the true official position of Anglicanism, successfully meet all the attacks made upon it so constantly and so vigorously by the Roman Catholics?'

To both these questions he confidently gives an affirmative reply. But just as Prof. Wieman by his abandonment of Christian Theism must seem to many to have 'sold the pass' to materialism, so it may well seem that a defence of Anglicanism which sets out to demonstrate its substantial if not entire agreement with Roman doctrine is a surrender rather than a defence since the whole *raison d'être* of Anglicanism is thereby cut away. As the late Bishop Henson wrote many years ago:

> 'There is confessedly no difference between the teaching and worship of the Anglo-Catholics and those of the Roman Church. Why, then, should an unreal and misleading separation be maintained? . . . All that

it (*i.e.* Anglo-Catholicism) stands for can be provided by the Church of Rome' (*In Defence of the English Church*, pp. 32-33).

But in any case Dr. Circlot's whole treatment of his theme is so narrowly legalist, and allows so little weight to be placed upon the undoubted comprehensiveness of historical Anglicanism that it can hardly carry conviction save with those who like himself 'recognize an unconditional obligation to belong to a genuinely Catholic Church' (p. 395). Such a Church would include only those who believe—

> 'that it (the "deposit of faith") includes the Threefold Ministry in an unbroken ordinational succession from the Apostles, and Baptismal Regeneration, and the Real Objective Presence, and the Eucharistic Sacrifice, and the sacerdotal conception of the Priesthood, and the power of true sacramental Absolution, and Confirmation as the same thing it has always been throughout the history of Catholicism, and the teaching of Christ about marriage and divorce, and Holy Orders as truly sacramental, and other points rejected by certain segments of Protestantism, and especially the Catholic conception of the Church and of the teaching authority of the Church and of the relation of the Bible to this authority, to say nothing of such truths shared with the older Protestantism as an Objective Atonement, and the Incarnation, and the ever-blessed and most Holy Trinity' (p. 394).

Between the liberal and the traditionalist a great gulf is unquestionably fixed. Yet Dr. Circlot is prepared to allow a measure of comprehensiveness, even though it is not a large one. And when he says—

> 'A God of Truth can be served only by the victory of Truth. May He give the victory to those whose position is (*sic*) most in accordance with the Truth' (p. viii)—

all liberally-minded Christians will heartily concur.

A second recent book by the same author is an equally careful study entitled *Christ and Divorce,* and it is of course written from a similar standpoint. The relevant sayings of our Lord are examined, including the 'exception clause' in Matt. v. 32 which Dr. Circlot pronounces to be unauthentic. He admits that Christ's teaching about divorce, as upon other subjects, was conveyed through general principles rather than in specific precepts. Nevertheless he holds that—

> 'If the underlying principle in our Lord's divorce teaching is the indissolubility of marriage . . . then the underlying principle in this particular case completely and decisively excludes any remarriage after divorce as long as the divorced spouse remains alive. . . . Thus the very same method of interpretation which in other cases makes many exceptions possible in the present case produces exactly the opposite result, because of the peculiarly inflexible nature—not of the precept, but—of the underlying principle' (p. 79).

It may be questioned whether this argument is so convincing as Dr. Circlot believes, and whether it is not in fact forced and arbitrary. Nevertheless it is largely on the strength of it that he concludes—

> 'With the sacred trust of the Deposit of Faith, committed to us in words that "shall not pass away" . . . we have no right to—WE DARE NOT—be "liberal"' (p. 197).

Yet in spite of himself he *does* dare to be liberal, for the voice of reason is not ignored. 'We ought,' Dr. Circlot declares, 'to be able to find reasons

for the truth as our Lord taught it. Let us, then, ask the question, 'What saith reason . . . ?' (p. 160).

It is not the differing conclusions we arrive at but the methods we employ in reaching them which are of primary significance. So long as Reason is not excluded, there is hope that Truth will in the end prevail.

D. L. Scott.

PASTORAL MEDITATIONS*

This book contains chapters on Penitence, Faith, Suffering, Love, Prayer and Sacrament, and has something of interest and edification to say upon each. A few typical passages may illustrate the nature of the volume.

> 'From the unregenerate to the regenerate nature there is no passing by any self-determination of will or self-application of effort. There is an impassable gulf between the soul as it is by nature and the soul as it is by grace, which no merely human resourcefulness can overcome. The transition is of Christ. The best that man can do is to desire Christ, but Christ must come to man's rescue' (p. 20).

> 'The term faith, in the New Testament, signifies a fundamental trust in, and self-commitment to, the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and by this self-commitment to God, the whole inner life finds not only release from the vagaries and tyrannies of the instinctive life, but also gains new levels of perception and power' (p. 27).

> 'When Jesus so urgently asked men to have faith, He never meant mere resignation, but rather the fullest exercise of a power which could remove mountains; prayer being a confident importunity. Never, in all His extensive intercourse with sufferers, did He speak of suffering as appointed by the will of God, but as the work of Satan whose kingdom He and His followers had to defeat by using the Father's power to heal disease' (p. 45).

> 'Prayer is the life-breath of the spiritual nature, and from it and by it man receives light and life, impulse and strength, peace and power, submission to and harmony with the Divine Will, grace to do and to be. Prayer is more than "the soul's sincere desire"; it is the soul's direct contact with God; and under its influence man participates in the Life of God' (p. 82).

Canon Baggott has some interesting and suggestive things to say on the sacramental principle, which he treats in a rational and inclusive manner.

> 'It postulates the worth of the body; declares the body to be the partner of a complete redemption; predicts its future place in a higher state; draws on the material world for help, using its elements for spiritual ends, until not the body only but the whole creation shall be restored to its original beauty, sinlessness, and perfection.'

This book supplies much material for profitable reflection, but this will not always lead to agreement with the author's conclusions. A.B.

* *Jesu, Joy of Man's Desiring*, by L. J. Baggott. (Longmans. 6/-.)

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

THE CLAIMS OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: A SERIOUS OMISSION

SIR,

Here is an impression — nothing more ambitious — of the Archbishop's book, *The Claims of the Church of England.*

It is by one who has been in Holy Orders as long as Dr. Garbett and would wish as whole-heartedly as he to maintain those 'claims,' yet with no claims himself to such scholarship as might assess the value of such an able and attractive book. But because of the Archbishop's large-hearted and persuasive advocacy, this reader of the book feels the pathetic lack of any such generous recognition of that company of devoted Churchmen which is not ashamed of the label 'Modernist.' It was Prof. Bethune Baker who said:

> 'Modernism stands out perhaps most clearly as a new method: "system" it never has been.
>
> 'Modern Churchmen have been those who responded more readily than others to the stimulus of new thought and knowledge, new ideas and experience, new revelations of the spirit of man and of God, and sought to domesticate them all in the Church and the religion it offered men as their guide to the truth of things in life and thought.'

No one will imagine the Archbishop could be alarmed, as doubtless smaller minds are, by a label such as 'Modernist,' but all that the scientific attitude and the historic sense have done for enlightened Churchmanship and a progressive theology is only casually touched on amid the author's gallant efforts to embrace in a united Church the extremes of Evangelicanism and Anglo-Catholicism.

These two movements—and how graciously the Archbishop recognizes it—are indeed at one in the sphere of devout religious fervour, but has he no place in his all-embracing Church for seekers after profound truth whose equally simple, devout religion is enriched by a studious cultivation of mind as well as of heart?

There is, indeed, a reference to Cranmer and Creighton as supporting 'sound learning,' but after a glance at 'divines and scholars' who appealed to 'the Scriptures and the Fathers,' the author's gaze seems to be turned anywhere but to the more modern scholarship which, with the warmth of true religion at its heart, is alone able to commend divine Truth to a more widely educated and more critical generation.

There is so much charm, such breadth of experience, such moving sincerity in this book that it is the more piteous — it is indeed tragic — that a generously disposed Church of England should be pictured as if it had no place now for what many thinking people and loyal members of the Church claim as the chief anchor of hope for reviving interest in 'the fellowship of the Gospel.'

As to externals, Dr. Garbett is sympathetically conscious of how the Evangelical's bare form of worship and the Anglo-Catholic's sumptuous ceremonial may be antagonistic and yet there may be a deep religious unity. If modern critical conclusions, frankly stated, are unwelcome to his mind, might he not recall Dean Rashdall's pronouncement:

> 'There are intellectual problems which the Church is bound to face if it would hope to retain its intellectual hold on the modern world.
>
> 'A Church which fails to hold the modern world on its intellectual side will not long be able to retain its hold on the moral or emotional or the purely religious and practical side.'

If we can all only meet harmoniously in the glow of heartfelt devotion and the consciousness of God, should the light of Spirit-guided reason be any less warming than the throb of emotional worship or the rapture of ecstatic adoration?

The Archbishop was doing active service in the Church when Mandell Creighton, as Bishop of London, was bringing a new vitality into the theological atmosphere. The reader of Dr. Garbett's book, soon after that time, was fortunate enough to come into personal touch with Professors Burkitt and Bethune Baker, Alfred Fawkes (whose valuable book, *The Genius of the English Church,* is still to be treasured) with Dean Inge, Dean Rashdall and with Canon Raven. It was in reference to what these and others were able to accomplish that Bethune Baker said:

> 'Whoever else goes out of the Church of England, Modernists must not, for it is their natural home.'

Has the Archbishop, then, no place beside his kindly hearth for leaders of thought such as these devoted Churchmen?

'Christianity,' wrote Professor Raven, '*was* a creative and victorious adventure,' and at the Reformation, Creighton has reminded us, the question was 'in what relation the system of the Church was to stand towards the aspirations of the national life,' but 'the gradual alienation of thoughtful minds has occurred . . . with lamentable results to the national life.'

If indeed the Church of England is to be inclusive and to meet 'the aspirations of the national life,' it is surely well to remember how Creighton also said, 'Its eyes are turned to the past for illustration and warning, not for imitation,' and it must have eyes for the dawning future too.

It is the outlook that matters, and Dean Inge was able to quote Bishop Gore as saying:

> 'Let us thank God that He has called us to unfold a growing message, not to rehearse a stereotyped tradition';

while he himself announced:

> 'The age is really craving for a more adequate presentation of Christianity.'

The world is actually, as Streeter told us,

> 'looking for guidance, but the guide must be one who has the courage to discard what is obsolete and the insight to create what is new.'

Such an attitude of mind is, we notice, clearly enough recognized by the Archbishop, who insists that 'the parochial clergy should be kept in close touch with the latest theological thought,' and, with Sir Richard Livingstone, would regret that many of them have lost their 'intellectual and imaginative vigour.' Can it be because of some too narrow use of the emancipating word 'Catholic' that, after all, no place seems to be allotted to liberal thinkers in a hospitable Church to express fearlessly their hardly-won conclusions?

In the early part of his book Dr. Garbett tells us, 'The word "Catholic" was originally used to describe the universality of the Church in all places and among all men,' but, as Bethune Baker has assured us, even 'the sacred books and formularies of all kinds can be an impediment and a drag,' and Fawkes was able to say, 'There is a sectarian sense of the word Catholic and Catholicism can be "the apotheosis of tradition."' Or is it something still

more fundamental that is the hindrance? 'In all ages,' Streeter declared, 'the Spirit of Christ must impel men to criticize contemporary tradition.' To check the desire for Truth and its free expression suggests a lack of faith in Him who bears the title of 'The Truth'!

> 'The true remedy,' says Rashdall, 'for narrow and mechanical views of inspiration, doctrine, church, sacrament and the like, is not the impossible attempt to do without them, but to go on to fuller and more adequate conceptions of them all.'

Creighton warns us of the difficulty of distinguishing

> 'between what is necessary to explain the truth and what fritters away the supreme claim on the intelligence as well as on the feelings.'

Among the 'claims' of the Church of England, must we miss this supreme 'claim'? 'The whole of man,' said Creighton, 'must be claimed for Christ.'

Will others, we wonder, have the same 'impression' that something vital is missing from among these persuasively advocated claims of the Church of England?

H. J. TRUEMAN.

[We regret, that owing to the serious illness of our reviewer, we have been unable to publish in *The Modern Churchman* a review of the Archbishop of York's volume.—ED., *M.C.*]

URGENT NEED FOR MODERNIST UNITY

SIR,

The reaction against Liberalism in theology and Church life has now gone so far that alarm is being expressed, not only among professed Modernists, but among very many ordinary Christian people already alienated from the Church of England or shaken in their loyalty by a reactionary process which affronts the predominantly Protestant conscience of the English people.

'I was brought up Church, not Catholic, and if the parsons go Catholic they can have the churches to themselves,' said an old gardener recently.

There is an obvious danger that reactionary principles may soon be given legal form. We may live to see a clergyman dismissed for refusing to excommunicate, say, an ex-prisoner of war who was deserted by his wife while in captivity, divorced, and subsequently re-married.

The time has come, not only for Modernists, but for all liberally-minded Christians to unite. It seems to me that the first step should be to remove the chief source of weakness in any presentation of our case. That is, divisions among liberal people on issues not strictly relevant to their theological liberalism.

The members of the scrum in the Rugger team for which I play have various political opinions. But, not considering these relevant to Rugger, they do not obtrude them and so are able to remain united in their specific purpose of shoving the opposing pack. It is tragic that some liberals, while remaining in complete sympathy with the M.C.U., have been alienated by irrelevant considerations to the great weakening of liberal witness.

It is possible for a sincere Modernist to be a socialist and a pacifist, just as it is possible for him to be a conservative and a non-pacifist. What is important is that people with such views should unite in witness to Liberal Christianity — as they can if neither obtrudes too exclusively his attitude to politics or war.

I believe that if this were made quite clear the M.C.U. could rally to its support every variety of Liberal Christianity in the Anglican Communion

and repel the reaction which is driving so disastrous a wedge between Church and people.

N. S. POWER.

Immanuel Vicarage, Highter's Heath,
Birmingham 14.
January 17th, 1948.

[United action by liberals is certainly desirable but freedom of speech is even more desirable, and freedom of speech too often defeats unity of action. Of course when political issues cut as deep and as sharp in England as they do to-day, it would certainly help to promote unity in religion if religious leaders would remain silent on political issues. But since these political issues are identified by them with religious issues they are unable to remain silent. Dr. Percival, the Bishop of Hereford and formerly Headmaster of Clifton and Rugby, used to say that it made for social stability in England when ecclesiastical parties cut across political parties at right angles. This large-minded English liberalism is out of fashion to-day and, until we recover it, we shall not be able to secure religious unity of action united to freedom of political speech. In this sphere the B.B.C. is playing a valuable part with its expanding freedom of religious discussion and political discussion.—ED., *M.C.*]

ELECTIONS TO THE COUNCIL OF M.C.U.

SIR,

As the date of the Annual Meeting has not yet been fixed by the Council of the Union it will be necessary for all nominations for election to the Council, with the names of seconders, to reach me by April 13th in order to ensure their validity in accordance with Rules 6 and 17 of the Constitution.

The following retire after three years on the Council and are not eligible for re-election, but may be co-opted for a year: Miss A. M. Ashley, Miss M. K. Body, Revs. Dr. G. W. Butterworth, C. E. Godfrey-Thomas, Canon Marcus Knight, F. I. L. Rees, Professor N. Sykes, D. E. H. Whiteley and T. J. Wood.

The following retire after serving by co-option and are eligible for election or for co-option: Revs. H. Bailey, Canon J. S. Bezzant, L. B. Cross, W. G. Fallows, L. C. Luckraft, R. H. Preston, Canon I. T. Ramsey, C. E. Seamer and H. C. Snape, Mr. M. S. Gotch and Miss M. I. Walker.

There are ten vacancies to be filled by election, which is for a period of three years.

R. GLADSTONE GRIFFITH,
Hon. Secretary, Modern Churchmen's Union.

Steeple Claydon Vicarage, Bletchley, Bucks.
February 11th, 1948.

COMMENTS

SIR,

Two comments on *The Modern Churchman* (Vol. XXXVII, No. 2):—

(*Modern Tritheism*, p. 155):

'If we speak of three distinct centres of consciousness, it is doubtful whether we ought to speak of Christian monotheism at all.'

Wheeler Robinson.

(*Brains Trust*, p. 163):

About forty years ago Rashdall in a conversation with me remarked, 'Theology and philosophy are the same thing.'

T. F. ROYDS.